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ABSTRACT 
THE RIGHT TO REMAIN MARRIED: POSITIONING HOMOSEXUAL-
TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGES UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN MARRIAGE ACT 
25 OF 1961 
GC MATTHYSE 
LLM Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Western Cape 
For many, the human rights which South Africa has been able to secure for LGBTI (lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex) people has been very progressive. However, with the 
conflation of sexual orientation and gender identity, the assumption of access to human rights 
for all within the LGBTI and society at large, has led to transsexual people not being able to 
claim their rights and assert their existence as human beings effectively within our 
constitutional democracy.  
Currently, there is a vacuum in South Africa’s law of marriage based on its inability to 
accommodate spouses who married as a ‘heterosexual’ couple but where the one spouse 
subsequently undergoes gender affirmation, conforming the relationship to what is perceived 
as ‘homosexual’. On account of this, the Department of Home Affairs are subjecting these 
couples to compulsory or forced divorces by refusing to have the transsexual spouse 
recognised within his or her affirmed gender on the marriage certificate. This means that the 
transsexual spouse either remains married under the Marriage Act and is subject to being 
recognised as his or her birth-sex, or submits to a compulsory or forced divorce in order to be 
recognised as his or her affirmed sex on a marriage certificate issued under the Civil Union 
Act upon them ‘remarrying’.  
This thesis addresses the inequalities and inequities brought about by the Marriage Act. It 
investigates the history of marriages within South Africa that were prohibited based on 
characteristics such as race which people have no control over. It looks at how the State, 
through its departments, has imposed itself on the social relationships people formed subject 
to its legal terms and conditions. This thesis questions whether the State through its action is 
acting in a way that is administratively just. It argues that the successfulness of a divorce 
decree is dependent on at least one party voluntary applying for it. This presupposes the idea 
that whenever couples who are validly married are forced or compelled to divorce one 
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another that this, in fact, cannot be seen as one of the valid ways in which to obtain a divorce 
decree legally.  
Before venturing into the legal aspect concerning this research topic, a theoretical framework 
will be advanced to position these couples in a greater social context. Subsequently, in order 
to establish the legal position of these couples, this thesis will draw on the current South 
African human rights discourse that has been developed by and for the LGBTI community, 
especially as it relates to the law of marriage. It will also establish the international and 
foreign human rights discourses that assert or, at least, seek to assert LGBTI human rights 
broadly. Ultimately, a constitutional analysis will be conducted to establish the position of 
these couples under the Marriage Act.  
 
11 January 2016 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
The disconnect between legal and social understandings of marriage reveals the heterosexual, 
companionship model as [an] idyllic social myth…1 The treatment of sexual and gender 
minorities as second-class citizens, serves as a barrier to accessing constitutionally guaranteed 
rights and services. In addition, gaps in present legislative and policy responses… further 
exacerbate such barriers.
2
 
1.1. Introduction 
Over the past 20 years of democracy, development in the law of marriage has illustrated the 
ability of South Africa’s democracy to (re)negotiate and advance respect for difference 
through the amendment and adoption of a myriad of laws governing intimate relationships.
3
 
Regrettably, the law has not been able to fully comprehend the nuanced interplay between 
sexual orientation and gender identity and thus formulate a constitutional rights discourse for 
post facto same-sex couples. The heteronormative, cisgender and monogamous imagining 
and practice of intimate human relationships and marriage are insidiously pervasive. Without 
interrogating this dominant narrative, all other forms of intimate human relationships will 
continuously be subjected to legal and social marginalisation. This thesis thus focuses on the 
narrative of couples married under the South African Marriage Act, who due to the gender 
affirmation of one spouse, now find themselves positioned on the margins of the law based 
on their actual or legally perceived gender identity and sexual orientation.   
                                                          
1
  Robertson, K.C. ‘Penetrating sex and marriage: The progressive potential of addressing bisexuality in 
Queer Theory’ (1998) 75(4) Denver University Law Journal 1375. 
 
2
  Nel, J.A. & Judge, M. ‘Exploring homophobic victimisation in Gauteng, South Africa: Issues, impacts and 
responses’ (2008) 21(3) Acta Criminologica 20; See generally Nel, J.A. ‘Towards the “Good Society”: 
Healthcare provision for victims of hate crime from periphery to centre stage’ (2007) Unpublished 
doctoral thesis.  
 
3
  Prior to National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 sodomy 
and consensual same-sex sexual acts, both common-law crimes, were criminalised in South Africa. 
Subsequently, based on the ruling in Geldenhuys v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 (5) BCLR 
435 (CC), the age of consent for same-sex sexual acts were aligned to that of opposite-sex sexual acts 
within the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 by the Sexual Offences and related matters Amendment Act 32 
of 2007. The age of consent now uniformly is set at the age of 16 years; Same-sex marriage was only 
legalised as of 2006 by promulgation of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006; See generally Sloth-Nielsen, J. & 
Van Heerden, B. ‘The constitutional family: developments in South African family law jurisprudence under 
the 1996 Constitution’ (2003)17 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family. In this article the 
authors discuss the different forms nuclear and extended families take. These would include families with 
same-sex partners who at times are also same-sex parents, Muslim marriages, customary marriages, 
amongst others. 
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1.2. Background to study 
South Africa has a history of making arbitrary determinations around whom and what 
constitutes a lawful marriage.
4
 A glaring example is the prohibition that was placed on 
interracial marriages.
5
 Despite the advances the country has made in eradicating racial 
discrimination in the law of marriage, sexual apartheid has suspiciously withstood the test of 
time under a new regime supposedly committed to democracy and human rights for all. 
Evidently, non-normative sexualities and gender identities remain a sight of great 
contestation and struggle.
6
 The legacy inherited from a highly racist, gendered, classist and 
oppressive regime are still pervasively present in the law. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is based on a case study that the Department of Home Affairs 
(the State) is currently legitimising a change in governing legislation for post facto same-sex 
couples from that of the Marriage Act to the Civil Union Act by way of subjecting the 
                                                          
4
  Jacobson, C.K., Amoateng, A.Y. & Heaton, T.B. ‘Inter-racial marriages in South Africa’ (2004) 35(3) Journal 
of Comparative Family Studies 444. The Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 provided the machinery 
to designate the racial category of every person, but its application also led to the breaking up of homes. 
Section 1(2) of the Prohibition on Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 put a prohibition on marriages 
between Europeans and non-Europeans; W v W 1976 2 SA 308 (W) is illustrative of how the law is able to 
undermine transsexual people married to their cisgender partners; See generally South African Law 
Commission (Project 52) Report on the investigation into the legal consequences of sexual realignment 
and related matters (1995); See generally Vincent, L. & Camminga, C. ‘Putting the “T” into South African 
human rights: transsexuality in the post-apartheid order’ (2009) 12 Sexualities. 
 
5
  Loveland, I. By Due Process in Law? Racial Discrimination and the Right to vote in South Africa 1855 - 1960 
(1999) 244; See generally Monsieur Van Den Berghe, P.L. ‘Miscegenation in South Africa’ (1960) 1(4) 
Cahiers d’ètudes africaines. If a European married a non-European such a marriage was declared void and 
with no effect. If a person was aware that his or her spouse was not of the same racial grouping as herself 
or himself then such a person would be guilty of perjury. 
 
6
  Delport, C. & Delport, R. ‘I didn’t marry the body, I married the person inside’ In Judge, M., Manion, A. & 
De Waal, S. To have and to hold: The making of same-sex marriages in South Africa (2008) 335. Christelle 
Delport and Raven Delport got married under the Marriage Act (25 of 1961) in the 1980s as a 
heterosexual couple when Christelle was still legally deemed to be a male as reflected in the births 
register. Christelle consequently made it known to her spouse that she wanted to affirm her gender by 
undergoing gender affirmation. In 2004 after her physical transition, Christelle and Raven were informed 
that in order for her to legally change her sex description, the two had to first get divorced under the 
Marriage Act. The couple divorced and Christelle’s birth register was amended. As a result they now have 
to remarry in terms of the Civil Union Act (17 of 2006) because the Marriage Act no longer applies. 
Consequently, it appears as if prior to 2006, the year the Civil Union Act was passed, and subsequent to 
2004, the year in which they got divorced, they had no legal recourse other than to remain a divorced 
couple who had accepted each other’s differences and wished to remain married. The position that 
Christelle otherwise would have occupied would have been to remain married to her partner Raven 
under the Marriage Act but subject to her sex description remaining unchanged. Hence, she would have 
been a female-bodied person with a female gender identity but with a male sex-description on the 
marriage certificate.  
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couples to a compulsory or forced divorce, as being driven from the perspective of upholding 
heterosexuality as a prerequisite under the Marriage Act in practice.
7
 Progressively, the 
legislature and court have stepped in to remedy the situation for a transsexual person who 
seeks to marry a cisgender person of the opposite legal sex.
8
 It has however not been as 
considerate and responsive to the needs of post facto same-sex couples. 
1.3. Problem statement and the rationale for the research 
South Africa has a history of nullifying heterosexual marriages where one spouse is 
transsexual and legally deemed a person of the opposite sex in relation to their partner.
9
 
Currently, there is a vacuum in South African law of marriage as to the constitutional manner 
in which to govern post facto same-sex marriages. The Marriage Act is exclusionary and 
precludes same-sex couples from marriage in practice.
10
  
                                                          
7
  Legal Resources Centre & Gender Dynamix Briefing paper: Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 
No. 49 of 2003 (2014) 24. In this Briefing paper the stakeholders discuss the notion that there is no legal 
basis in law currently for subjecting post facto same-sex couples to compulsory or forced divorces. 
 
8
  Van der Merwe, L. ‘Press Release: Nadia Swanepoel, transgender women receives justice’ available at 
http://www.iranti-org.co.za/content/Press_Releases/2014-Nadia-Swanepoel/Transwoman-gets-justice-
Nadia-Swanepoel.pdf (accessed 12 October 2014). This matter deals with Nadia Swanepoel being a 
transgender woman, who was born a male finally being able to marry her cisgender male-born partner 
under the Marriage Act. After having been denied the right to marry under the South African Marriage 
Act due to the Department of Home Affairs not having amended her identity document to reflect her 
female gender and subsequently having had her marriage to her male-partner registered under the Civil 
Union Act, Nadia finally received justice based on being classified as a heterosexual woman in a 
heterosexual marriage. Hence, her marriage has been registered as such under the Marriage Act. If the 
Department of Home Affairs is so stringent in incorporating heterosexual-transsexual couples under the 
Marriage Act, how much so for homosexual-transsexual couples? Skelton, M. et al. Family Law in South 
Africa (2010) 36. The legislature has seemingly remedied the position of transgender people wanting to 
marry. This has been done by virtue of the operation of the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status 
Act 49 of 2003. S3(2) of the Act provides that a person will be deemed for all purposes to be a person of 
the affirmed sex description, once this has been recorded in terms of the Births and Deaths Registration 
Act 51 of 1992.  
 
9
  Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act 81 of 1963, s7B. According to s7B of this Act, a person 
could alter his or her sex description retrospectively and would thus be recognised legally as a person of 
the opposite sex; See W v W 1976 2 SA 308 (W). W v W set the legal precedent that post-operative 
transsexual people could not be recognised as members of their affirmed sex for purposes of marriage. It 
took away the legal effect that s7B could have had in protecting the interests of a transsexual person to a 
heterosexual marriage. 
 
10
  Bilchitz, D. & Judge, M. ‘The Civil Union Act: Messy compromise or giant leap forward?’ In Judge, M., 
Manion, A. & De Waal, S. To have and to hold: The making of same-sex marriage in South Africa (2008) 
150. The legislature opted to pass the Civil Union Act as a separate piece of legislation governing same-
sex ‘marriages’ and civil partnerships in particular instead of including the word ‘spouse’ in the marriage 
formula as encapsulated in the Marriage Act. This would have included same-sex couples and post facto 
same-sex couples under the ambit of the Marriage Act by making it gender neutral. 
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Section 3(3) of the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act (Act 49)
11
 clearly 
stipulates that no right which accrued to a person before the alteration occurred shall be 
adversely affected after the alteration. Presumably, and as this thesis argues, this right 
provides a legal mechanism through which post facto same-sex couples can claim their right 
to remain married if all the legal requirements of a valid marriage were met at the time the 
marriage was concluded.
12
   
1.4. Research question 
In utilising the Transgender, Queer and Feminist lenses as tools of analysis, these three 
questions are foundational to the achievement of the objectives of this thesis: 
i. What is the de facto and de jure position of post facto same-sex marriages in 
South Africa, particularly as it relates to the Marriage Act?  
ii. To what extend are the rights of post facto same-sex couples being compromised 
as a means to reinforce heteronormativity?   
iii. What is the best way in which to include and protect post facto same-sex 
marriages within the current South African constitutional dispensation, bearing in 
mind the values and principles of substantive equality, freedom and dignity? 
 
1.5. Conceptual clarification 
Language has been used as a powerful weapon in the processes of constituting bodies, 
constructing identities and how society and the law come to imagine and interact with various 
sexual and gender identities. Henceforth, how human identities are understood in a complex 
manner and contextually conceptualised and framed in this thesis is of paramount 
importance. 
1.5.1. Inclusive language 
Traditionally, the law has been structured around a binary conceptualisation of sexes and 
genders. In this thesis a binary construction of human bodies will only be used when 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
11
  Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003. 
 
12
  Skelton M. et al. Family Law in South Africa (2010) 34 - 52. These requirements include the following: The 
partners should have the necessary capacity to get married, they must voluntarily consent to the 
marriage, the marriage must be lawful and it must take place in conformity with all the prescribed 
formalities. 
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contextually applicable. The construction of transsexual citizenship is predominantly 
premised on a binary conceptualisation of sex and gender.
13
  However, in the promotion of a 
more inclusive conceptualisation and framing of human bodies, neutral terms such as ‘they’, 
‘their’ and ‘hir’ as opposed to ‘him’ and ‘her’ or ‘he’ and ‘she’ will be used. 
1.5.2. Post facto same-sex couple 
This is a new term formulated for the purpose of this thesis. It is descriptive of couples who 
initially married under the Marriage Act
14
 and were legally deemed to be heterosexual, 
cisgender and monogamous at the time the marriage was concluded.
15
 However, subsequent 
to the conclusion of the marriage, one of the parties undergo gender affirmation medical 
procedures to align their sex with their gender identity. Upon completion of the procedures, 
the transsexual spouse amend their sex-status in the birth register to reflect that of their 
partner in accordance with the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act.
16
 The effect 
of such affirmation is that these couples are compelled or forced by the Department of Home 
Affairs (the State) to divorce when they apply for the amended sex status to be reflected on 
their marriage certificate. The consequence of not divorcing is that  the marriage certificate 
will continue to reflect the birth-sex of the transsexual spouse which leads to many social and 
legal difficulties. This brings about many social and legal challenges as the identity document 
reflects their affirmed sex whilst on the marriage certificate it reflects their birth-sex. 
However, should they opt to divorce  the only option is for them to (re)marry in terms of the 
Civil Union Act that is particularly designated for same-sex couples.  
1.5.3. Compulsory or forced divorce 
A compulsory or forced divorce, refers to a divorce forced upon a couple already married 
under the Marriage Act, by the Department of Home Affairs (the State), based on the fact that 
one of the spouses is a transsexual person who is in the process of legally affirming his or her 
                                                          
13
       See Transgender Theory at 2.2.3. and Transgender Citizenship at 2.3. 
 
14
  Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
 
15
  Whether one or both parties to the marriage in fact identified as heterosexual and/or cisgender at the 
moment when the marriage was concluded and during its subsistence is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
16
  Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003. 
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gender in accordance with Act 49.
17
 The divorce is compelled or forced in light of a legal 
alteration of the transsexual spouse’s sex on the marriage certificate not being able to be 
affected unless the couple divorce. 
1.5.4. Transgender and transsexual 
The term transgender is descriptive of a continuum of gender identities and gender 
expressions that are incongruent with contextually normative social gender identities and 
gender expressions associated with the two conventional binary sexes, male and female.
18
 
Societies have context-specific understandings of what sex identify with which gender and 
how they express themselves in line with the gender codes it embodies. Dynamically, 
transgender is an umbrella term that refers to transsexual people, gender non-conforming 
persons, drag queens and kings as well as androgynous people, to name a few.
19
 
For the purpose of this thesis, discussions will primarily focus on transsexual identity.  
Conscious of transgender identity politics, transsexual identity will be critically positioned 
within the broader transformational and social politics of the transgender discourse. 
‘Transsexual’ is a term used to describe a transgender person as someone who identifies as 
the conventional opposite sex and who has a strong and persistent need to alter his or her sex 
to that of the conventional opposite sex.
20
  
Currently, there are some uncertainty as to whether transsexual identity is an indefinite 
identity-category (even after gender affirmation) or whether it is linked to the specific period 
from which a person becomes aware of their cross-gender identification to the moment at 
which gender affirmation has been completed in the form of legal affirmation and surgical 
                                                          
17
  Legal Resources Centre & Gender Dynamix Briefing paper: Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 
No. 49 of 2003 (2014) 24. Gender Dynamix and the Legal Resources Centre uses ‘forced divorce’ to 
describe the unwanted State intervention into the continuation of post facto same-sex marriages under 
the Marriage Act.  
 
18
  Morgan, R. et al. Trans: Transgender life stories from South Africa (2009) 7.  
 
19
  Morgan, R. et al. Trans: Transgender life stories from South Africa (2009) 7; Jobson, G.A. et al. 
‘Transgender in Africa: Invisible, inaccessible, ignored?’ (3 September 2012) Journal of Social Aspects of 
HIV/Aids 161; See generally Sausa, I.A., Keatley, J. & Operario, D. ‘Perceived risks and benefits of sex work 
among transgender women: Systematic review and meta-analysis’ (2007) 48(1) Journal of Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndromes.  
 
20
  American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders 5 ed (2013) 451 – 
53. 
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intervention.
21
 This is an important element to consider in order to understand how the law 
engage transsexual bodies (de facto and de jure) for various legal interventions. However, 
this is a matter outside the scope of this thesis. 
1.5.5. Cisgender 
The concept ‘cisgender’ is descriptive of a person who is content with the sex assigned to him 
or her at birth and expresses him or herself in line with the socially prescribed gender norms 
associated with such sex.
22
 Being cisgender has no bearing on a person’s sexual orientation.23 
A person can be homosexual, asexual or bisexual yet at the same time be considered 
cisgender on the basis that they are content with the sex assigned to them at birth and content 
with identifying and expressing the gender associated typically with that sex. 
1.5.6. Gender identity 
Before defining the term gender identity, mention needs to be made that this thesis is 
premised particularly on the assumption that gender is a social construct that differs from 
context to context and presupposes that gender is not determined by a person’s sex but 
something that is learned.
24
 Hence, the term gender identity refers to a particular gender a 
person affirms and identifies with, irrespective of their sex assigned at birth.
25
  
  
                                                          
21
  Moser, E.C. A matter of life: When gender doesn’t work – A woman’s view on having been transsexual 
(2007) XIII. 
 
22
  Johnson, J.R. ‘Cisgender privilege, intersectionality, and the criminalisation of CeCe McDonald: Why 
intercultural communication needs transgender studies’ (2013) 6(2) Journal of International and 
Intercultural Communication 137; Morgan, R. et al. Trans: Transgender life stories from South Africa 
(2009) 5. 
 
23
  Jobson, G.A. et al. ‘Transgender in Africa: Invisible, inaccessible, ignored?’ (3 September 2012) Journal of 
Social Aspects of HIV/Aids 161. 
 
24
  American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders 5 ed (2013) 451; 
Morgan, R. et al. Trans: Transgender life stories from South Africa (2009) 6. 
 
25
  See generally Bradford, J.B. et al. Policy focus: How to gather data on sexual orientation and gender 
identity in clinical settings (2012); Jobson, G.A. et al. ‘Transgender in Africa: Invisible, inaccessible, 
ignored?’ (3 September 2012) Journal of Social Aspects of HIV/Aids 161. According to Bradford and 
Jobson, a person’s gender identity is not necessarily a fixity and may change during their lifetime. 
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1.5.7. Sexuality  
Sexuality is the collective term used to describe a person’s sexual orientation and sexual 
practice.
26
 This means that it is descriptive of who a person is attracted to and the sexual 
practices that a person engages in. In this context, sexual practice is not necessarily informed 
by a person’s sexual orientation and sexual orientation does not necessarily prescribe a 
person’s sexual practice.  
The term ‘sexual orientation’ describes who a person is physically, romantically, emotionally, 
intellectually and/or spiritually attracted to.
27
 Based on these factors a person can be attracted 
to their own sex and self-identify as and/or be defined as homosexual,
28
 that of the 
conventional opposite sex (heterosexual) or an intersex person.
29
 It is important to note that 
sexual orientation can be categorised as actual sexual orientation (what a person  believe their 
sexual orientation to be based on the factors above) or perceived sexual orientation (what 
other external actors belief a person’s sexual orientation is based on the same factors 
above).
30
    
1.5.8. Gender affirmation or sex reassignment  
These concepts refer to the process through which a person seeks to align their sex with their 
gender identity. Such alignment is possible by way of hormonal treatment, surgical 
intervention and/or legally amending the birth register, with their gender identity.
31
 For the 
purpose of this thesis, gender affirmation entails the legal affirmation of sex through the 
                                                          
26
   Young, R.M. & Meyer, I. ‘The trouble with “MsM” and “WsW”: Erasure of sexual minority person and 
public health discourse’ (2005) 95(7) AM J Public Health available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449332/ (accessed 18 October 2015). 
 
27
  Morgan, R. et al. Trans: Transgender life stories from South Africa (2009) 6. 
 
28
  See generally Reddy, V. ‘Decriminalisation of homosexuality in post-apartheid South Africa: A brief legal 
case history  review from sodomy to marriage’ (2006) 20(67) Agenda.  
 
29
  The politics of self-identification and being labelled by external parties is complex. Post-facto same-sex 
couples visibilises the many assumptions and determinations the law makes about human bodies based 
on how it perceives these human bodies. In this case, the rigidly constructed confines of law 
inadvertently define who people are based on who they choose as a partner and thus prescribe definitive 
sexual orientations and gender identities to people. 
 
30
  Rivers, I. ‘Social exclusion, absenteeism and sexual minority youth’ (2000) 15(1) Support for Learning 13.  
 
31
  American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders 5 ed (2013) 451; 
Newman-Valentine, D. & Duma, S.E. ‘Transsexual women’s journey towards a heteronormative health 
care system’ (2014) 1(2) African Journal for Physical, Health Education, Recreation and Dance 385. 
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amendment of a person’s birth register and marriage certificate in terms of the Alteration of 
Sex Description and Sex Status Act.
32
  
1.6. Literature review 
The visibility which transgender people now receive comes after a challenging period which 
saw ‘gender identity’ and ‘sexual orientation’ as two mutually exclusive concepts conflated 
under the latter concept. 
Coombs argues that the debate around same-sex marriage have wrongfully ignored 
transgender people.
33
  The author rebuts the assumption that same-sex marriage is just about 
being gay or lesbian. Vincent and Camminga argue that ‘sexual orientation’ usurped ‘gender 
identity’ as a separate rights-discourse in an early post-1994 era.34 This study agrees with the 
assertions of these authors due to the uncertain legal position post facto same-sex couples 
married under the Marriage Act now finds themselves in. With the passing of the Civil Union 
Act governing same-sex couples particularly and the effect of the Marriage Act still 
exclusively governing opposite-sex couples, it would mean that purposefully post facto same-
sex couples must be regulated prima facie by the Civil Union Act, despite having been 
legally and validly married under the Marriage Act.
35
 
In seeking to establish where post facto same-sex couples may position themselves under 
South African marriage law, this thesis will provide a clear legal outline as to the 
requirements, content and consequences of concluding a valid civil marriage under the 
Marriage Act.
36
 It also provides insight as to the circumstances under which a marriage is 
void or voidable and the consequences that are incidental thereto. Transgender case law will 
be cited, which provide an understanding as to the historical discourse which existed under 
                                                          
32
  Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003. 
 
33
  Coombs, M. ‘Sexual dis-orientation: transgender people and same-sex marriages’ (1998) 8 UCLA 
Women’s Law Journal 219. 
 
34
  Vincent, L. & Camminga, C. ‘Putting the “T” into South African human rights: transsexuality in the post-
apartheid order’ (2009)12 Sexualities 692. 
 
35
  Ntlama, N. ‘A brief overview of the Civil Union Act’ (2010) 13(1) PER/PELJ 191. 
 
36
  Cronje, D. & Heaton, J. South African family law 3 ed (2010) 44 - 63. 
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apartheid as well as the contemporary discourse under our democratic dispensation.
37
 The 
South African Law Commission’s Report on the investigation into the legal consequences of 
sexual realignment and related matters illustrates how the state viewed transgender bodies at 
the dawn of democracy.
38
 Citizenship is a fundamental concept that may encapsulate the 
experience of a person to participate in the life of a nation and be valued for whom they are 
(their bodies, their sexuality, their gender identity, their sexual orientation) in light of the 
laws and rights which makes this possible or not.
39
 Seidman, Evans and Monro thus 
elaborates on the impact of social and political power reflected in the level of ‘citizenship’ 
that accrues to transgender people.  
Ultimately, this thesis argues that excluding post facto same-sex couples from the Marriage 
Act where this was the Act which they initially married under is unconstitutional. It will 
illustrate how people who are different to the social norm reflected at a secular level in terms 
of the Marriage Act are overtly relegated to second-class citizens due their inclusion under 
the Marriage Act when they are considered heterosexual and cisgender
40
 but exclusion when 
this ceases to be the case. The scholarship will thus expose a material reality in South Africa 
that homosexual-transgender (transsexual) bodies are currently deemed of lesser value than 
heterosexual-cisgender bodies. 
1.7. Research methodology 
This thesis will consist of a critical qualitative desktop-based research method. This method 
of research finds relevance in the fact that the study will be exploring the legal landscape on 
‘marriage’ and the effect it has on the lives and experiences of people who are considered to 
be post facto same-sex couples under the Marriage Act. Primary sources consisting of a 
documented case study, case law, statutes and other legal documents will be analysed in light 
of how the law has been constructed to reinforce hierarchies of sexual and gender identities.   
                                                          
37
  See generally W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W); See generally Sims v Sims 1981 (4) SA 186 (D); See generally 
Corbett v Corbett [1970] 2 All E.R. 33 (Divorce Ct.). 
 
38
  South African Law Commission (Project 52) Report on the investigation into the legal consequences of 
sexual realignment and related matters (1995). 
 
39
  Hames, M. ‘Women’s rights, citizenship and ten years of democracy in South Africa’ (2006) 27(7) Third 
World Quarterly 1313. 
 
40
  Morgan, R. et al. (2009) 5.  A ‘cisgender’ person is described as a person whose gender identity is 
congruent with the sex they have been assigned at birth. 
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A contextual analysis will be undertaken to evaluate the rationale for possible exclusion from 
or inclusion of post facto same-sex couples under the Marriage Act.  In locating post facto 
same-sex couples within the ambit of the Marriage Act, secondary sources such as journal 
articles, books, reports, foreign law and international instruments will also be used. These 
documents are accessible through the library, websites and non-governmental organisations. 
They will be used to establish the development of an existing transgender discourse in South 
Africa. A content analysis will be done after collecting all the relevant secondary sources.
41
  
In doing the content analysis, this study will need to find and interpret patterns of overt and 
implied discrimination and prejudice and consequently classify these patterns. The patterns or 
trends will need to be analysed in their historical context, in the application of the legal 
historical method, as well as in their contemporary context in order to draw a conclusion on 
the type of development, if any, that occurred.
42
 An important element to the analytical 
process would be being conscious of the lens through which this analysis will be done. The 
research and sources will be analysed through a Transgender, Queer and Feminist lens. Using 
these lenses draws one’s attention to the problematic relationship which exists between sex, 
gender, sexuality and by extension the law.
43
 This lens is useful in advocating for the 
dismantling of existing social norms and structures in order to serve larger goals of 
empowerment, equity, equality, inclusion and transformation.  
As researcher and gender non-conforming person (an identity that is broadly categorised 
under the term ‘transgender’) I am caught in the binarism of being both insider and outsider 
in this research study. Chmielewski and Yost positions ‘insider’ research as an approach to 
qualitative research where investigation regarding a particular phenomenon is undertaken in a 
manner through which the investigator studies hirself, people like hir, hir family as well as 
community.
44
 Although insider status may potentially influence the research process it 
                                                          
41
  Flick, U. et al. A Companion to qualitative research (2004) 266. Accordingly, this book provides that the 
goal of the content analysis method of research is to examine certain material. 
 
42
  Du Plessis ‘A self help guide: Research methodology and dissertation writing’ (2007) 30 available at 
http://www.nwu.ac.za/sites/www.nwu.ac.za/files/files/pfl/documents/Du_Plessis_Research_Methodolog
y_FINAL.pdf (accessed 26 November 2014). The legal historical method in the process of affecting law 
reform by assessing the historical legal developments within a particular discourse and within legal 
institutions. 
 
43
 Fineman, M. ‘Introduction: feminist and queer legal theory’ available at 
http://www.ashgate.com/pdf/...Feminist-and-Queer-Legal-Theory-Intro.pdf (accessed 29 January 2013). 
 
44
      Wilkinson, S. & Kitzinger, C. ‘Representing our own experiences: Issues in “Insider” research’ (2013) 37(2)  
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challenges the claim that only sensitised outsider researchers can discover the ‘objective’ 
reality(ies) of other cultures and groups.
45
 The advantage of being insider is that one has a 
deeper understanding of the history of the institution, culture and interplay between people.
46
  
This thesis is premised on what Wilkinson and Kitzinger terms ‘[my] priori intimate 
knowledge’ of the transgender people I work with in addition to my own personal 
experience.
47
 Through the different roles I fulfil, I am aware of the shifting status of 
insider/outsider from moment to moment.
48
 As a transgender (gender non-conforming) 
identifying person I am automatically an insider. However, as a researcher and someone who 
has not experienced the bureaucracy and indignity that post facto same-sex couples endure, I 
occupy a space at a relative distance and power to their lived realities. Hence, I would be 
positioned what Grant describes as a ‘central’ outsider.49 
1.8. Delimitation of study 
The nature of the research topic is limited by the myriad of tensions, contradictions, 
paradoxes, ironies and ambiguities that arise when, as Audre Lorde argues, one tries to 
dismantle the master’s house with the master’s tools.50 Hence, this study is limited in various 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
         Psychology Women Quarterly 251; See generally Chmielewski, J.F. & Yost, M.R. ‘Psychosocial influences  
         in bisexual women’s body image: Negotiating gender and sexuality’ (2013) 37 Psychology of Women  
         Quarterly. 
 
45
      Wilkinson, S. & Kitzinger, C. ‘Representing our own experiences: Issues in “Insider” research’ (2013) 37(2)  
         Psychology Women Quarterly 251; See generally Hockey, J. ‘Research methods: Researching peers and  
         familiar settings’ (1993) Research Papers in Education; See generally Lewis, D.K. ‘Anthropology and  
         colonialism’ (1973) 14 Current Anthropology. 
 
46
       Hanson, J. ‘Educational development as researchers: The construction of insider research to enhancing 
         understanding of role, identity and practice’ (2013) 50(4) Innovation in Education and Teaching  
         International 391. 
 
47
      Wilkinson, S. & Kitzinger, C. ‘Representing our own experiences: Issues in “Insider” research’ (2013) 37(2)  
         Psychology Women Quarterly 251. 
 
48
      Wilkinson, S. & Kitzinger, C. ‘Representing our own experiences: Issues in “Insider” research’ (2013) 37(2)  
         Psychology Women Quarterly 252; See generally Kitzinger, J. & Kitzinger, C. ‘The “window in opportunity”  
         for death after severe brain injury: Family experiences’ (2012) Sociology of Health & Illness available at       
         http://www.doi:10.1111/1467-9566.12020. [accessed on 7 January 2016]. 
 
49
      Hanson, J. ‘Educational development as researchers: The construction of insider research to enhancing 
         understanding of role, identity and practice’ (2013) 50(4) Innovation in Education and Teaching  
         International 391; See generally Grant, B.M. ‘The mourning after: Academic development in time of  
         doubt’ (2007) International Journal for Academic Development. 
 
50
  Lorde, A. ‘The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house’ In Lorde, A.  Sister Outsider: Essays 
and speeches (1984) 110. 
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ways based on legal advocacy that seeks to achieve immediate short term relief for post facto 
same-sex couples as well as aligning this study to a broader transformative politic in the law 
of marriage long term. 
For many couples, marriage, especially marriage in terms of the Marriage Act is an 
oppressive institution that should be problematised and dismantled. In acknowledging the 
importance of advocating for radical transformation in law, this thesis will be limited to 
arguing for the continued legal inclusion of post facto same-sex couples under the protection 
of the Marriage Act. Hence, the study is centred around the seemingly discriminatory 
application of the Marriage Act in light of the non-normative sexual orientations and gender 
identities of couples.  
The focus of the study is not to establish a justification as to why post facto same-sex couples 
should be governed by the Civil Union Act when they got married under the Marriage Act. 
The purpose of the study is to highlight the discrimination couples face under the Marriage 
Act based on their homosexual sexual orientation and transsexual gender identity which 
subjects them to unnecessary and undue uncertainty, bureaucracy and instability. 
Consequently, the aim is also not to deconstruct ‘gender’ and ‘gender identity’ in proving 
their fluidity to the point of disempowering transsexual people who wish to switch between 
the two separate and essentialised genders.
51
 However, this thesis does critically place 
essentialist transsexual identity politics within broader fluid transgender politics.  
1.9.   Chapter outline 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic and provides insight into 
the research problem and research methodology premised on a case study and socio-legal 
background that is situated within the delimitation of the study. This chapter also provides 
clarification of complex concepts foundational to this study alongside the literature review. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
51
  Nagoshi, J.L. & Brzuzy, S. ‘Transgender theory: Embodying research and practice’ (2010) 25 Affilia: Journal 
of Women and Social Work 431. Previously essentialist approaches have emphasised that social identities 
are fixed within a person. However, feminist and queer theories locate social identities in between the 
conflict that exist between social determinants and that which is determined by the self. Hence, the 
degree and manner in which ‘gender’ should be deconstructed remains a much contested matter within 
both Feminist Theory and Queer Theory. 
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Chapter 2 situates the research problem within a broader theoretical framework. Queer 
Theory and Transgender Theory will be predominantly employed to articulate the disjuncture 
between the law, sexuality and gender identity. Feminist critique will be drawn upon to 
strengthen theoretical arguments presented by Queer Theory and Transgender Theory as they 
relate to non-normative sexualities and gender identities being continued casualties at the 
instance of patriarchy and heteronormativity.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the international legal instruments, international law and 
regional law that are applicable to shaping a LGBTI human rights discourse in South Africa, 
particularly as they relate to protecting post facto same-sex marriages.  
Chapter 4 engages the research topic within its historical context in South Africa and linking 
it to other forms of marginality, particular that of the prohibition of mixed race marriages 
during the years of apartheid. In focusing on constitutional imperatives and progressive 
legislation, an argument for the right of post facto same-sex couples is enunciated. This 
chapter also provides insight as to how flexible the law has been in granting couples access to 
marriage outside of the heteronormative cisgender status quo. 
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis by way of making recommendations premised on reimagining 
the law of marriage to be more flexible in its scope and application as a means to steer clear 
from subjecting post-facto same-sex couples, on account of their actual or perceived sexual 
orientation and gender identity, to overt and implied legal discrimination.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORISING GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
2.1.       Introduction 
‘Inequality is an outcome of particular social phenomena… [and] of an ideology that consists 
of a study of ideas and a rationalisation for dominance.’1 According to Karl Marx, the 
dominant ideas of an epoch are the ideas of the ruling class, which in principle and reality is 
still true today.
2
 These dominant ideas form the building blocks of the ruling culture which 
encourage people to think, act and believe in particular ways.
3
 Currently, because of its 
constructed compulsory nature, heterosexuality and being cisgender is the dominant sexual 
orientation and gender identity most people affirm.
4
  
A direct consequence of the operation of the politics of domination is that some groups 
occupy more superior social positions at the expense of others occupying more inferior 
positions. In addressing sexuality, Foucault asked: ‘What is at stake when constructing 
sexuality at different historical moments?’ He also questions how power circulates through 
the production of knowledge about sex?
5
 The context in which he asked this question was 
based on his argument that knowledge about something in a particular discourse is bound up 
with power.
6
 This questions and problematises the production of heteronormativity and 
cisgender as the only knowable truth about human existence. 
                                                          
1
  Kirsh, M.H. Queer Theory and Social Change (2000) 40. According to the author inequality in this context 
‘can be defined or asserted, analysed or deconstructed’. However, a discussion of its presence or absence 
plays out at the ideological level in relation to current social relations; See generally Therborn, G. The 
ideology of power and the power of ideology (1980). Therborn argues that ideology is not merely a social 
foundation but that ‘ideas’ have expressions that have political implications. 
 
2
  Marx, K. Writings of the Young Marx on philosophy and society ed (1967) 438. 
 
3
  Clifford, G. The interpretations of cultures (1973) 33. ‘Culture’ is defined in terms of theory as the way in 
which people find meaning in their surroundings; Kirsh, M.H. Queer Theory and Social Change (2000) 45. 
In relation to a shared system, ‘culture’ refers to the set behaviour and norms that people adhere to on 
an everyday-basis. It also commodifies things and gives them social meanings in order to define 
experiences. 
 
4
        Rich, A, ‘Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence’ In Jackson, S. & Scott, S. Feminism and  
Sexuality: A reader (1996) 130 – 41. 
 
5
  Spargo, T. Postmodern encounters: Foucault and queer theory (2000) 16. 
 
6
  Spargo, T. Postmodern encounters: Foucault and queer theory (2000) 16. 
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Heteronormativity as a system of domination can be defined as a system that is premised on 
cultural, legal and institutional practices that maintain normative assumptions about gender, 
sex and sexual attractions.
7
 It presupposes that gender is associated with a person’s biological 
sex, which is typically narrowed down to female and male, and can therefore only be 
performed in one of two ways, namely femininity and masculinity. Consequently, with 
women needing to perform femininity and men performing masculinity, heteronormativity 
prescribes that the two be mutually attracted to one another as a natural feature.  In this case 
compulsory heterosexuality and being cisgender relies on structures, institutions and social 
organisations such as religion, culture and the law for its maintenance through constant 
uninterrupted reinforcement.
8
 
In locating post facto same-sex couples under the South African Marriage Act, a 
deconstruction of heterosexual-cisgender legal privilege will be embarked upon in order to 
illustrate the adverse legal position which this demographic currently occupies informed by 
the associated social inequality. This chapter will seek to illustrate that homosexual people 
who identify as transgender (and specifically transsexual) have  unique voices derived from 
systematic discrimination which they continuously are exposed to.
9
 These narratives thus 
enables  the law to listen and respond to the challenges of these demographics of people. 
In response to difference, this chapter focuses on Queer Theory, Transgender Theory and 
Feminist critique as a means to understand the exclusion of post facto same-sex couples from 
the Marriage Act. These theories will be synthesised to advance a theoretical framework that 
seeks to promote the inclusion of post facto same-sex couples under the Marriage Act for 
                                                          
7
  Kitzinger, C. ‘Heteronormativity in action: Reproducing the heterosexual nuclear family in after-hours 
medical calls’ (2005) 52(4) Social Problems 477 - 98; Kristen, S. & Westebrook, C. ‘Doing gender, doing 
heteronormativity’ (August 2009) Gender & Society 441. 
 
8
  Rich, A. ‘Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence’ (Summer 1980) 6 Sign: Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society 633 & 48. Institutions of heterosexuality are the ‘benchhead’ of male dominance and 
oppress everything and anyone that is not male and masculine. [Cisgender heterosexual] men have 
particular power over everything and everyone that does not embody this. ‘…the failure to examine 
heterosexuality [patriarchy and cisgenderism] as institutions is like failing to admit that the economic 
system called capitalism or the caste system of racism is maintained by a variety of factors, including both 
physical violence and false consciousness.’ 
 
9
  See generally Gender Dynamix and Legal Resource Centre Briefing paper: Alteration of Sex Description 
and Sex Status Act, No.49 of 2003 (2013). The Briefing paper identifies various challenges that the 
transgender community experience within South Africa. Amongst others, these include, denial of access 
to health care, bureaucracy in amending identity documents to reflect their affirmed ‘sex’, being 
subjected to ‘forced’ or ‘compulsory’ divorces (the subject of this thesis); and experiencing depression, 
discrimination and financial constraints. 
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continued legal protection by challenging sexual and gender inequality, constructs of 
normality and gender binaries. They are instrumental in explaining and rationalising the 
inherent oppressive position occupied by post facto same-sex couples within the law of 
marriage. 
2.2.      An inconvenient reality: Theorising the intersectional dilemma of post facto 
      same-sex couples 
LGBTI peoples’ experiences of society and the law are very specific. Their adverse realities, 
narratives and politics are often overlooked or ignored in order to address different forms of 
marginalisation and oppression considered to be more important. These would include 
racism, sexism and classism that are arguably a more ‘comfortable’ politic to engage in as 
opposed to the politics of sexuality and gender. Queer Theory, Feminist critique and 
Transgender Theory exposes this discomfort whilst simultaneously calling upon structures 
such as the law to account for the lack of recognition and protections afforded to LGBTI 
people. 
2.2.1. Queer theory: Challenging the ‘normal’ 
The word ’queer’ can be used in one of two ways. It can be used either as a noun or adjective 
and in both ways it is in response to what is considered ‘normal’ or ‘normalising’.10 
According to a Foucauldian discourse analysis,
11
 Queer Theory is a collection of intellectual 
engagements that critically describe a diverse range of critical practices and priorities in lieu  
  
                                                          
10
  See generally Foucault, M. The history of sexuality: An introduction (1990); Spargo, T. Postmodern 
encounters: Foucault and queer theory (2000) 8; Butler, J. Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of 
sex (1993) 228. Butler provides that the term ‘queer’ should be a site of ‘collective’ contestation that 
ensures that it itself can expand for political purposes; Halperin, D.M. Saint Foucault: Towards a gay 
hagiography (1995) 79. Halperin in turn defines ‘queer’ as an essence(less) identity without a given 
condition but filled with endless possibility. It puts up a resistance to social norms (the status quo) in 
order to positively construct different ways of life. 
 
11
  Spargo, T. Postmodern encounters: Foucault and queer theory (2000) 7. A Foucauldian discourse analysis 
is premised on the theories of Michel Foucault around social power relations. Michel Foucault was a gay 
identifying philosopher, historian and activist. His influential intellectual work was generally categorised 
as poststructuralist. The predominant focus of his work was about knowledge and power which has 
formed a paradoxically destabilising foundation for recent work on the human [subject].  
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of the relations between sex, gender and sexual orientation.
12
 McRuar describes ‘queer’ as a 
critical perversion that has the ability to form unexpected alliances, giving voice to those 
whom the current heteronormative and cisgender culture seeks to silence.
13
 
In academic realms, Queer Theory has developed as a course of inquiry within the past two 
and a half decades.
14
 The focus of the theory has loosely been directed at illustrating the ways 
in which traditional disciplinary expositions have failed to do justice to queer populations.
15
 
Queer Theory seeks to place the question of sexuality as the centre concern and as the key 
category through which other social, political, and cultural phenomena are to be understood.
16
 
These phenomena would be inclusive of the law. As a postmodern and post-structural theory, 
it focuses on the rejection of all categorisations in that they are limiting because they have 
been labelled by dominant power structures.
17
  
As a category ‘queer’ is always in the process of formation with a definitional indeterminacy 
that dramatises the incoherency in the alleged stable relations between chromosomal sex, 
                                                          
 
12
  Spargo, T. Postmodern encounters: Foucault and queer theory (2000) 9 - 10. These critical practices and 
priorities include various readings about same-sex desire and how these are represented in literary texts, 
films, music, images. It also includes an analysis about the social and political power relations 
encapsulated by sexuality. It critiques the sex-gender system and studies transsexual and transgender 
identification, sadomasochism and transgressive desires. 
 
13
  McRuer, R. The queer renaissance: Contemporary American literature and the reinvention of lesbian and 
gay identities (1997) 5. 
 
14
  Kirsh, M.H. Queer Theory and Social Change (2000) 32. Writings have been particularly focussed on social 
sciences with the aim of addressing the medical canon eventually in light of specifically addressing the 
reinterpretation of various assumed concepts. 
 
15
  Kirsh, M.H. Queer Theory and Social Change (2000) 32. Teresa de Laurentis first used this term in 1989; 
Hogan, S. & Hudson, L. Completely Queer: Gay and Lesbian Encyclopedia (1998) 491.  Teresa de Laurentis 
used the term at a conference in 1989 in the context of questioning the meaning assumed in the binary 
definitions of sexuality; See generally Sedgwick, E.K. Between Men (1985); See generally Sedgwick, E.K. 
Epistemology of the closet (1990). 
 
16
  Edgar, A. & Sedgwick, P. Key concepts in cultural theory (1999) 321. 
 
17
  Kirsh, M.H. Queer Theory and Social Change (2000) 33; Namaste, K. ‘The politics of inside/out: Queer 
theory, poststructuralism, and a sociological approach to sexuality’ (July 1994) 12 (2) Sociological Theory 
220. ‘Poststructuralism’ is typically associated with the French philosophers Foucault and Derrida in 
relation to the interpretation of ‘the self’ and ‘the social’ in light of breaking traditional epistemologies. It 
shifts away from the autonomous individual being the creators of themselves and their social worlds. It 
highlights the power of complex networks of social relations. 
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gender and sexual desire.
18
 Hence, Queer Theory proposes that the traditional 
‘heterosexual/homosexual’ dichotomy be abandoned in order for the emergence of more 
ways of describing and analysing sex and gender.
19
 This latter point has particular relevance 
for this thesis as it problematises the current legal dichotomy between homosexuality and 
heterosexuality that essentialises sexuality to the detriment of recognising and protecting 
sexual and gender differences in a more complex and nuanced fashion. 
Queer Theory will be used in this thesis as a means to deconstruct the institute of marriage as 
it is known under the Marriage Act as the constructed ‘normal’ or ‘normalising’ institution. It 
will focus on such deconstruction in as far as it seeks to exclude post facto same-sex couples 
from legal protection. For the purpose of this thesis, claiming inclusion and protection under 
the Marriage Act does not mean that post facto same-sex couples seek to uphold the hetero-
patriarchal status quo of marriage. In relation to radical transformation,  it can be seen as a 
means to effectively dramatise the incoherency in the ‘alleged’ stable relations between 
chromosomal sex, gender and sexual desire. Due to this, post facto same-sex couples are 
positioned as key in dismantling and radically transforming the traditional understanding of 
marriage as protected by the Marriage Act as the socially superior institution protecting 
families. In line with challenging the traditional ‘heterosexual/homosexual’ dichotomy, post 
facto same-sex couples blur the space of ‘normality’ because it exposes the incoherency of 
attaching value to certain relationships over and above ‘Others’. The need for the structural 
and social exclusion of post facto same-sex couples from the Marriage Act illustrates the shift 
of the couple from being perceived as ‘normal’ to an ‘abnormal’. 
  
                                                          
18
  See generally Jagose, A. Queer Theory: An introduction (1998) 23. Queer theory is always inflected by a 
sense of potentiality that cannot quite articulate; See generally Halperin, D.M. Saint Foucault: Towards a 
gay hagiography (1995). 
 
19
  Kirsh, M.H. Queer Theory and Social Change (2000) 34. Queer Theory is also different from Gay and 
Lesbian politics because by asserting ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ categories as subjects automatically erases 
everyone who do not perfectly match. 
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2.2.2. Feminist critique: Understanding equality 
Feminist legal theory was initiated in the context of the limitation which laws and theoretical 
constructs that were created by men, placed upon women.
20
 According to Sylvia: ‘Early 
feminist approaches to law and legal reform were derived from the civil rights movement and 
race relations.’21 Amongst the many types of feminism, all of them ask a central question: 
‘how to understand gender from a critical and equality-driven perspective.22 The focus of the 
equality project in feminism is that of achieving both formal as well as substantive equality.
23
 
This thesis links the struggles of transgender people to feminism through Spade’s correct 
assertion that being ‘transgender’ has more to do with a person’s gender (and sense of gender 
identity) than with a person’s sexuality.24  
South Africa, like other parts of the world, is governed by politics of domination in which 
one party must be superior at the expense of the inferiority of ‘the Other’ in the context of 
systematic dehumanisation.
25
 The principle of challenging domination from an empowering 
position based on social oppression is derived from feminism. Feminism has been at the 
vanguard of challenging male social dominance. The rationale being that due to the 
polarisation of two sexes, male and female, that the social subordination of women as a group 
were natural on account of their purported physical inferiority, fragility and vulnerability 
                                                          
20
  Menkel-Meadow, C. ‘Feminist Legal Theory, Critical legal studies and legal education or ‘The Fem Crits go 
to law school’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal Education 71; See generally Sylvia, A. ‘Law, Rethinking Sex and 
the Constitution’ (1984) 132(5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review. In the United States of America 
women at the time sought equality as well as ‘equal protection’ under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, the Supreme Court interpreted ‘equality’ in a way that did not always result in equal treatment 
of women. This was the case as it used the ‘equality’ principle in a way that did not take into account the 
differences between men and women. Its failure to treat pregnancy as a sex discrimination problem 
signalled a great example of how formal equality may exist but how hollow it can be in practice and 
reality. 
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      Sylvia, A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution (1984) 132. 
 
22
  Fineman, M. “Introduction: Feminism and Queer Legal Theory” In Fineman, M. Feminism and Queer Legal 
Theory: Intimate Encounters, uncomfortable conversations (2009) 197. 
 
23
  Craig, E. ‘Converging feminist and queer legal theories’ (2010) 28(1) Windsor Year Book 213. . 
 
24
  See generally Spade, D. ‘Resisting medicine, re/modelling gender’ (2003) 15 Berkeley Women’s Law 
Journal. 
 
25
  Marx, K. Writings of the Young Marx on philosophy and society ed (1967) 438; Nagoshi, J.L. & Brzuzy, S. 
‘Transgender theory: Embodying research and practice’ (2010) 25(4) Affilia: Journal of Women and Social 
Work 433. 
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when compared to men.
26
 However, the ideological differences regarding the destabilisation 
of the gender binary, which was instrumental in affirming women as different and a 
foundational principle in the arguments for formal and substantive gender equality between 
men and women, ultimately polarised feminism.
27
 A feminist critique, therefore, gets its point 
of departure from the experiential point of view of the people and groups in society that are 
oppressed, dominated and devalued.
28
 Hence, Feminist critique argues that the previously 
devalued be revalued.
29
 In line with this essentialist argument, the same principles would 
apply in transgender people challenging cisgender domination and homosexual people 
challenging heterosexual domination based on their differences informing their right to 
access formal and substantive equality. In this way, feminism provides a promise of social 
and legal reconstruction for transsexual people informed by conceptual construction coupled 
with experience.
30
 
Traditionally ‘gender’ is assumed to be based on a mandatory binary system that fills a 
person’s physically sexed body with social characteristics.31 Post-structural feminism 
challenges this fixed binary conception of gender identity by providing that such an 
                                                          
26
       Hooks, B. “Understanding patriarchy’ available at  
http://www.imaginenoborders.org/pdf/zines/UnderstandingPatriarchy.pdf accessed (1 November 2015);  
Hooks, B. Feminist theory: From margin to centre 2ed. (2000) 11 – 4. 
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  Nagoshi, J.L. & Brzuzy, S. ‘Transgender theory: Embodying research and practice’ (2010) 25(4) Affilia: 
Journal of Women and Social Work 433. 
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  Menkel-Meadow, C. ‘Feminist Legal Theory, Critical legal studies and legal education or ‘The Fem Crits go 
to law school’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal Education 61. 
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  Menkel-Meadow, C. ‘Feminist Legal Theory, Critical legal studies and legal education or ‘The Fem Crits go 
to law school’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal Education 61. 
 
30
  See generally Held, V. ‘Feminism and Epistemology: Recent work on the connection between gender and 
knowledge’ (1985) 14 Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
 
31
  Nagoshi, J.L. & Brzuzy, S. Transgender theory: Embodying research and practice’ (2010) 25(4) Affilia: 
Journal of Women and Social Work 433. In terms of an essentialist understanding of gender this would 
presuppose that if a person is born a male that he takes on a masculine gender and be sexually attracted 
to women and if born a female that she takes on a feminine gender and be sexually attracted to men; See 
generally Connell, R.W. Gender: A short introduction (2002). An essentialist understanding of gender 
therefore perpetuates the stereotype that all people are cisgender and heterosexual and negates the fact 
that many people identify as being transgender and/or homosexual. In upholding the traditional 
understanding of gender and sex, the so-called status quo, society makes use of both positive and 
negative reinforcement mechanisms such as the law, religion and culture. See generally Hausman, B.L. 
‘Recent transgender theory’ (2001) 27 Feminist Studies. 
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essentialist view omits to address the intersectional issues that make up a person’s identity.32 
Butler, a post-structuralist feminist critic of gender, argues that ‘the materiality of the body 
was “already gendered, already constructed”, such that the supposed physical basis of the 
gender binary was a socially derived construction of reality.’33 This argument presupposes 
the idea that a person’s sense of identity and by extension gender is fixed to a certain extent 
due to the physicality of the body. Here, Butler’s argument is not absolute but provides for 
the appreciation of transsexual persons who identifies strongly with the gender typically 
associated with the opposite sex in the binary construction and understanding of gender and 
sex.  
Feminist scholars have addressed ‘gender’ from various perspectives and have defined it in 
numerous contexts. These perspectives and definitions include ‘gender’ being a mere 
attribute of a person, to it being a form of social organisation as well as it being an ideology 
that informs sex-roles, power differentials and analytical categories.
34
 Harding argues that 
‘gender’ is an important part in the process of how people are identifiable by others, how 
relationships are organised as well as how meaning is developed through certain natural and 
social events.
35
 Hence, if the complexities of transgender existence are actively omitted from 
law-making processes and laws, it would mean that their existence would continuously be 
subjected to questioning which makes it challenging for them to be legally recognisable. In 
turn, it makes it challenging to build meaningful relationships and organise themselves in a 
manner that will acquire meaning within the formal legal framework for the purpose of social 
transformation.  
According to Hausman ‘gender’ is an ‘epistemology’  for knowing and understanding how 
cultures define identities in relation to social construction informing people’s perception and 
experiences of the world and their supposed sense of belonging to one gender category or the 
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  Nagoshi, J.L. & Brzuzy, S. ‘Transgender theory: Embodying research and practice’ (2010) 25(4) Affilia: 
Journal of Women and Social Work 433. 
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  Butler, J. Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of “sex” (1993) xi. 
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  Hawkesworth, M. ‘Gender as an analytical category’ In Hawkesworth, M. ed Feminist inquiry: From 
political conviction to methodological innovation (2006) 6 & 12.  
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  See generally Harding, S. The science question in feminism (1986). 
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other.
36
 If a transgender understanding of gender is excluded what we know about gender is 
limited and how the legal system offers protection to transgender people is strained. 
In light of the equality argument that feminism presents, an altered equality argument relating 
to sexual orientation and gender identity may be ‘what is needed to achieve formal and 
substantive equality for post facto same-sex couples in a system such as marriage law that 
promotes heterosexuality and cisgenderism as being a more legitimate way of founding a 
family’? The equality argument in feminism brings to the fore key indicators such as 
systematic dehumanisation, systematic devaluing of people, social oppression and the 
polarisation of sexes that belies the politics of domination. Together these trample over the 
rights of post facto same-sex couples much like it does in relation to women. In the context of 
post facto same-sex couples the question then becomes, how can a demographic such as post 
facto same-sex couples, who have previously been devalued along the lines of both sexual 
orientation and gender identity, be revalued under a system of marriage law, specifically the 
Marriage Act, in light of the overarching right of these couples to access equality? 
2.2.3. Transgender Theory: Dismantling binaries 
The term ‘transgender’ is broadly seen as an umbrella term that encapsulates various forms of 
non-normative gender identities and expressions.
37
 By its very nature, Transgender Theory 
premised on transgender lived experiences challenges the heteronormative assumptions  
  
                                                          
36
  Hausman, B.L. ‘Recent transgender theory’ (2001)27 Feminist Studies 473; See Stryker, S. ‘My words to 
Victor Frankenstein above the village of Chamounix: Performing transgender rage’ GLQ: A Journal of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies (1994). 
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  Tanis, J. Transgendered theology ministry and communities of faith (2003) 18. Tanis defines 
‘transgender(ed) people’ as people who do not comfortably fit into the traditional social understandings 
of sex and gender; See generally Stryker, S. ‘My words to Victor Frankenstein above the village of 
Chamounix: Performing transgender rage (1994) 1 GLQ: Journal of Gay and Lesbian Studies; See generally 
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al. Transgender life stories from South Africa (2009) 5 - 7; See generally Green, J. Becoming a visible man 
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which exist in relation to gender, sexuality and identity.
38
 It is defined as a theoretical 
orientation that encompasses the different and unique experiences of transgender people as a 
group.
39
 It challenges the essentialist approaches to gender and gender identification that 
argues that these two concepts are fixed within a person by breaking set gender roles through 
emphasising the fluidity of gender, gender identification and expression which exist and are  
embodied.
40
  
For Transgender Theory, having a fixed or essential understanding of a person’s social 
identity without taking into account social construction, self-construction and a person’s lived 
experiences would amount to validating and justifying that class, race, sex and other 
differences are natural.
41
 However, this does not mean that Transgender Theory seeks to 
invalidate modes of identification between the traditional binary sexes of male and female by 
proposing that gender is an artificial phenomenon.
42
 The importance of not being dismissive 
of gender identification also being informed by biology is derived from the experiences of 
transsexual people, on the transgender continuum, who experience innate cross-gender 
                                                          
38
  Nagoshi, J.L. & Brzuzy, S. ‘Transgender theory: Embodying research and practice’ (2010) 25(4) Affilia: 
Journal of Women and Social Work 432. Transgender theory addresses these assumptions much more 
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identification.
43
 Broadly, Transgender Theory actively advocates for both the social and legal 
recognition of transsexual people within society. 
Contrary to Queer Theory that has a broader focus in deconstructing any structure that holds 
itself out as ‘normal’ or ‘normalising’ in relation to sexuality, Transgender Theory has a 
narrower focus. Transgender Theory’s focus is on collapsing the heteronormative and 
cisgender nature of marriage under the Marriage Act and seeks to advance the interests of 
post facto same-sex couples who have effectively broken the set gender roles with their 
transgression of gender, gender identity and expression.  
2.3.   Transgendering ‘citizenship’ in South Africa 
Citizenship in South Africa has always been a politically charged and contested notion. Today it 
serves as a unifying symbol within the broader political project of nation building. …the term is 
inextricably bound up with the struggle for liberation and democracy. Citizenship is of immediate 
significance in South Africa since it is related to the construction of a coherent and unifying 
national identity.
44
 
Johnson correctly argues that citizenship is heteronormatively conceptualised which forms 
the basis for the political system and associated discourses.
45
 Consequently, there has been a 
strong push by activists that a model of citizenship be constructed that consisted of fairness 
and justice of social-liberalism, yet at the same time guaranteeing the protection of all  
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  Newman-Valentine, D. & Duma, S.E. ‘Transsexual women’s journey towards a heteronormative health 
care system’ (2014) 1(2) African Journal for Physical, Health Education, Recreation and Dance 385. 
Newman-Valentine and Duma follows adopts Spicer’s definition of a ‘transsexual’ person; Spicer, S.S. 
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minorities based on various grounds including sex, gender and sexual orientation.
46
 
When seeking to understand transgender citizenship, it becomes challenging in grouping all 
the various expressions and identities under one homogenous group and generalise in order to 
achieve the goal of accessing full citizenship for transgender people.
47
 Tensions become 
evident in the way certain types of transgender identities and/or expressions are allowed to 
claim social inclusion.
48
 This assertion presupposes that there are various approaches to 
claiming transgender citizenship. The first approach is to advance universal claims to equal 
rights at the risk of homogenising difference.
49
 The second approach is based on a 
participatory model that seeks to address difference but does not fundamentally alter the 
status quo that excludes transgender people.
50
 Hence, Walby questions whether ‘citizenship’  
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  Monro, S. & Warren, L. ‘Transgendering citizenship’ (2004) 7(3) Sexualities 346. 
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  Lane, R. ‘Trans as bodily becoming: Rethinking the biological as diversity not dichotomy’ (2009) 24 
Hypatia. Here, Lane is concerned that transsexual voices may be silenced and ultimately erased under 
‘transgender’; Monro, S. ‘Transgender politics in the UK’ (2003) 23(4) Critical Social Policy 445 - 7. 
According to the New Labour approach in conjunction with it drawing on Neoliberalism and 
Communitarianism, a greater emphasis has been placed on social inclusion, individual rights and 
responsibilities in participatory democracies that allows for minority groups such as transgender people 
to gain social inclusion. However, such social inclusion is limited in as far as transgender people are 
willing and able to uphold a gender-binaried conceptual framework. This means that gender fluid people 
who seeks to develop a radical transgender movement challenging the gender-binary constructs of 
society are unable to claim full citizenship within this model whereas transsexual persons who fit into the 
binary construction are able to do so; See generally Bornstein, K. Gender Outlaw: On men, women and 
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Dennis Rodman (1996). 
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can ever be successfully claimed as universal and whether social divisions will always affect 
it?
51
 
Narrowly put, post facto same-sex couples are located at the intersection between 
homosexual sexual orientation and transgender gender identity. In presenting a legal 
argument that protects these couples from being discriminated against, an important question 
to be asked is ‘how do one advance the interests of transsexual people in legally perceived 
homosexual relationships without limiting or destroying the rights of other transgender 
people with a more fluid sexual orientation, gender expression and/or identity in the process?’ 
In their ability to uphold the gender binary system, heterosexual identifying transsexual 
people may claim their ‘citizenship’ much easier than gender fluid people by way of being 
assimilated into the mainstream structures such as marriage that uphold heteronormativity. In 
order for all transgender people to be included within the ambit of social and legal protection, 
it would entail a process of affecting fundamental changes to the current system that upholds 
and protects sex and gender categorisation.
52
  
As a concept ‘citizenship’ can be defined as collection of rights and duties that determines 
whether or not a person or group of people are able to access socio-political membership, 
resources and benefits as well as membership to the politico-legal community.
53
 Politically, 
‘citizenship’ can also be defined as a public activity that concerns itself with the 
establishment and monitoring of boundaries between people or groups of people.
54
 In looking 
at the Marshallian model and/or tradition of citizenship, the dominant model of claiming 
citizenship in western societies, there is a clear focus on the civil or legal, political and  
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subsequent social phases that citizenship takes.
55
 However, contemporary critiques have 
uncovered that this model is built upon a very gendered foundation supported heavily by 
patriarchal assumptions. 
56
  Hence, in order to uphold this underlying gendered-patriarchal 
model of citizenship, certain mechanisms were built into society whereby certain 
demographics could claim full citizenship whereas others were considered lesser citizens. 
Bacchie and Beasley correctly argue ‘that bodies give substance to citizenship, and that 
citizenship matters to bodies.’57 The distinction between ‘citizenship’ and ‘body’ links to a 
greater discussion around what is considered the public realm of men being active, rational 
and universal; and the private realm of women being emotional, body-bound and particular.
58
  
The premise of this argument is found in the association of government responsibilities with 
the controlling of spaces in which citizen bodies operate and subsequently making decisions 
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  McEwan, C. ‘Engendering citizenship: Gendered spaces of democracy in South Africa’ (2000) 19 Political 
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  Bacchi, C.L. & Beasley, C. ‘Citizen Bodies: Is embodied citizenship a contradiction in terms?’ (2002) 71(22) 
2 Critical Social Policy Issue 329.; See McEwan, C. ‘Engendering citizenship: Gendered spaces of 
democracy in South Africa’ (2000) 19 Political Geology. According to the author, the public sphere is the 
sphere of justice, the space where everyone is treated equally whereas the private sphere is that of the 
family where citizens are allowed to act on their personal ideas and notions of morality; See generally 
Benhabib, S. Situating the self: Gender, community and postmodernism in contemporary ethics (1992); 
See Gilligan, C. In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development (1982); Lister, R. 
Citizenship: Feminist perspective (1997) 126. It is apparent that in addressing ‘mind over body’ politics 
that women’s bodies are depicted in the public realm where it is less personal, as controlling women. 
Examples of how this is depicted can be found in women’s status as citizen being watered-down by 
‘legitimate’ practices such as female genital mutilation and women’s reproductive rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
as to the type of support services it will render.
59
 For this reason, it is important to identify 
how bodies are conceptualised in public policy in order to eventually look at the 
consequences of such conceptualisation.
60
 In this way, one can seek to understand the social 
demarcation between full and lesser citizens that are premised on the assumptions made 
about bodies.
61
  
2.4.      State policing of bodies 
Everywhere that trans[gender] people appear in the law, a heavy reliance on medical evidence to 
establish gender identity is noticeable. Try to get your birth certificate amended to change your 
sex designation, and you will be asked to show evidence of the surgical procedures you have 
undergone to change your sex. Try to change your name to a name typically associated with the 
[conventional] ‘other gender’, and in many places you will be told to resubmit your position with 
evidence of the medical procedures you have completed. Try to get your driver’s licence sex 
designation changed, and again you will be required to present medical evidence. If you are trans 
or gender transgressive, even your ability to use a gendered bathroom without being harassed or 
arrested may be dependent on your ability to produce identification of your gender, which will 
only indicate your new gender if you have successfully submitted medical evidence to the 
authorities.
62
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The policing of a person or couple’s gender and sexuality is a direct outcome of the onus of 
having to produce medical evidence to access or be denied rights in almost every trans-
related case and is inclusive of determining the legitimacy of a marriage involving a 
transgender spouse.
63
 The importance of addressing transgender rights from the perspective 
of a human rights-based approach is to attain recognition of transgender rights  and enforce 
them without dependence on surgical status or medical evidence.
64
 By de-medicalising 
transgender gender identity, and reinterpreting it in a human rights-based discourse, the 
process of gender affirmation moves away from being deemed an ‘illness’ to being based on 
a basic right of all people, which is the right to self-determination.
65
 Transsexuality is 
currently still seen as a medical disorder.
66
 In reinterpreting transgender rights grounded in a 
human rights-based model the quest must be to provide transgender people with self-
affirmation without subjecting them to limitations on how they define and emancipate 
themselves. People should be free to assert their own gender identity and expression without 
being coerced into declaring such identity involuntarily or be subjected to choosing an 
identity amongst a narrow set of medical or legally determined option.
67
 The European 
Commission for Human Rights held in Van Kuck v Germany  that the freedom to define 
oneself as female, if born a male, is one of the most basic essentials of self-determination.
68
  
The medical model has been very instrumental in obtaining rights for transgender people in 
order to assert their humanity. This has particularly been the case through the strategic use of 
                                                          
63
  Spade, D. ‘Resisting medicine, re/modelling gender’ (2003) 15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 17. 
 
64
  See generally San Francisco Human Rights Commission Compliance Guidelines for the anti-gender identity 
discrimination position of its Human Rights Law. The aim of the Commission is to move away from the 
standard of body modification (medical model) to self-determination (human rights-based model) as the 
core determinant of gender identity; Spade, D. ‘Resisting medicine, re/modelling gender’ (2003)15 
Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 30. 
 
65
  Van Kuck v Germany Appl. No 35968/97 ECHR judgement 12 June 2003 82. In deciding this matter, the 
European Commission on Human Rights found that the right to affirm one’s gender identity is one of the 
basic rights of being human, that of self-determination.  
66
  See generally Karasic, D. & Drescher, J. Sexual and gender diagnoses of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM): A reevaluation (2012). 
 
67
  Spade, D. ‘Resisting medicine, re/modelling gender’ (2003) 15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 29; See 
generally Socïas, M.E. et al. ‘Towards full citizenship: Correlates of engagement with Gender Identity Law 
among transwomen in Argentina’ (2014) 9 (8) PLoS ONE available at 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0105402 (accessed 22 September 
2015). 
 
68
  Van Kuck v Germany Appl. No 35968/97 ECHR judgement 12 June 2003 82. 
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the medical model of transsexuality in light of a pre-democratic judicial system refusing to 
recognise gender transitioning for the purpose of marriage, no matter what medical evidence 
was produced.
69
 However, counter-progressively, if a person does not uphold the narrow 
definitions and categories provided for by the gender regulatory processes of the medical 
model in order to obtain gender affirmation surgery, then the backlash can be dehumanising, 
traumatic and ultimately impossible to complete.
70
 The broader question posed with regard to 
a transgender person accessing gender affirmation surgery is how will this demographic be 
able to access protection from discrimination when both medicine and law continuously 
confirm the lack of understanding for the humanity and dignity of this demographic? 
In relation to homosexuality and being transgender, in a new democratic dispensation based 
on constitutional rights, government has a responsibility to protect the bodies, integrity and 
autonomy of people of all sexualities and gender identities within all spaces and spheres in 
which these demographics operate as citizens. This presupposes that transgender and 
homosexual bodies must be respected in law, and in this case also family law. Transgender 
bodies are, and for a long time homosexual bodies were, conceptualised as being ‘ill’, ‘sick’ 
or ‘disturbed’. They have been pathologised by way of the medical model and criminalised 
by the legal system.
71
  Consequently, at a social level they had to invisibilise themselves in 
order to avoid being labelled a criminal or being labelled as ‘sick’ or ‘disturbed’. This in 
itself led to people of non-normative sexualities and gender identities being excluded from 
                                                          
69
  Spade, D. ‘Resisting medicine, re/modelling gender’ (2003) 15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 30; See W v 
W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W). The case dealt with the determination of a post-operative female’s sexual identity 
for the purpose of marriage and divorce. Under the circumstances, in order for a decree of divorce to be 
granted it first had to be proven that a valid marriage was contracted. In determining the plaintiff’s sex, 
the court asked the question as to what the sex was of the plaintiff prior to the operation and whether 
such an operation indeed changed the plaintiff’s sex to that of the opposite assigned at birth. If it did not 
then the marriage was invalid. The court followed the approach as set out in the English case of Corbett v 
Corbett; See Corbett v Corbett [1970] 2 All E.R. 33 (Divorce Ct.). As per Corbett v Corbett male 
chromosomes, gonads and genitalia cannot reproduce that which a naturally-born woman can. Thus, if a 
person fails to prove that his or her chromosomes, gonadal and genitals are that of the chosen gender, all 
operative interventions are ignored. Consequently, the biological constitution of a person is fixed at birth, 
at the latest, and this cannot be changed by either the natural development of organs associated with the 
opposite sex or medical or surgical intervention. Thus, the plaintiff’s operation could not alter ‘his’ true 
sex. For these reasons the marriage was declared void because the plaintiff was at all times deemed to be 
a male who was married to another male. The judge ordered that the plaintiff has no claim for divorce 
and the division of the joint estate. The judge also ordered that the marriage be annulled on account that 
the summons be appropriately amended. 
 
70
  Spade, D. ‘Resisting medicine, re/modelling gender’ (2003)15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 29. 
 
71
  See generally Vincent, L. & Camminga, C. ‘Putting the “T” into South African human rights: transsexuality 
in the post-apartheid order’ (2009) 12 Sexualities. 
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much needed government protection. In essence this culminated in them being deemed lesser 
citizens to heterosexual and cisgender people. It is precisely because these demographics 
have been left to the mercy of the medical and psychiatric fraternity that the idea of them 
being at the mercy of their own bodies has been reinforced to the extent that they are 
excluded from the so called ‘normal’. By medicalising, criminalising and invisibilising 
bodies with non-normative sexualities and gender identities in the public realm, government 
has effectively divorced them of their propriety rights over their own bodies which ultimately 
results in them being unable to claim their full citizenship and being deprived of their 
political autonomy. This is in direct conflict with the State’s duty not to intrude on the 
political autonomous control a citizen has over their body. The limitations placed on post 
facto same-sex couples are real. The adverse assumptions made about their bodies, 
relationships and existence are real. Henceforth, before we can imagine to transform 
structures such as family law, a truthful rendition of the power politics involved in 
relationship formation needs to be critically addressed. 
2.5.       Conclusion 
As can be deduced from the above, a strong argument can be made that the inequality, 
whether it be social or legal, that post facto same-sex couples face today, comes as a direct 
result of the hegemony which the dominant gender identity and sexual orientation, 
cisgenderism and heterosexuality, has over the law. Evidently, its hegemony is sustained by 
other institutions like religion, medical discourse, culture and tradition.  
In looking at the above, it is clear that equality for people with non-normative sexual 
orientations and gender identities still remain elusive and may still continue to be elusive, if 
the aim of the law is to merely seek to socially include post facto same-sex couples within its 
narrow heteronormative and heterosexist understanding of transgender and homosexual 
politics. In not seeking to legally transform the law in such a way that it truly seeks to 
understand and respect difference it will continuously fail in its ambition of affording 
protection to all by ending up affording protection to the status quo. In discussing legal 
transformation, international law has been progressively, albeit slow, pushing a discourse on 
non-normative sexualities and gender identities. Chapter 3 outlines and discuss various 
international instruments as they relate to LGBTI human rights.                                       
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EVER EXPANDING RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE ON NON-NORMATIVE SEXUALITIES, GENDER IDENTITIES AND 
THE RIGHT TO MARRY AND REMAIN MARRIED          
3.1.      Introduction 
Since the advent of democracy, South Africa has passed a kaleidoscope of progressive laws 
focussed on undoing the injustices of the past and empowering marginalised communities 
and people; as well as having developed a progressive equality jurisprudence to ensure that 
rights are realised or, at least, realisable. Indeed, South Africa has made many progressive 
strides in affording legal recognition and protection to non-normative intimate relationships.
1
 
However, even with these legal developments over the last 20 years, it would appear as if the 
debate around same-sex marriages has wrongfully ignored the challenges faced by 
transgender persons in South Africa despite a progressively enabling legal landscape.
2
  
The South African Constitution clearly provides that international law be used when 
applicable to interpret rights contained in the Bill of Rights.
3
 For this reason, this chapter will 
focus on framing an enabling human rights context that is conducive to the stability and 
wellbeing of post facto same-sex marriages by locating LGBTI rights within the international 
human rights framework.  
 
                                                          
1  The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 affords parties to polygamous customary 
marriages legal protection. The Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 extends legal protection to same-sex couples in 
monogamous relationships identical to that of opposite-sex couples under the Marriage Act. The 
Marriage Act now governs the union between opposite-sex couples, even though one party is a 
transsexual person. See Van der Merwe, L. ‘Press Release: Nadia Swanepoel, transgender women 
receives justice’ available at http://www.iranti-org.co.za/content/Press_Releases/2014-Nadia-
Swanepoel/Transwoman-gets-justice-Nadia-Swanepoel.pdf (accessed 12 October 2014); See discussions 
around affording legal recognition and protection to couples in domestic partnerships in Minister of 
Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) and Muslim marriages available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/2010_muslim-marriages-bill.pdf. 
2
  Coombs, M. ‘Sexual dis-orientation: Transgender people and same-sex marriage’ (1998) 8 UCLA: 
Women’s Law Journal 219. 
 
3  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). S39(1)(b) provides that when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum—must consider international law.  
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3.2.      International law: Not cast in stone - continuously negotiating LGBTI freedom 
 and equality 
There is a presumption amongst conservative groups and States that international law, 
particularly as it relates to the founding of a family and the right to marry, is prescriptive, and 
that a marriage can only be constituted by couples who are of the opposite sex.
4
 International 
law does not require states to make provision for same-sex couples to marry.
5
 However, in 
the absence of expressly defining what a family is, it acknowledges that families exist in 
diverse forms.
6
 The following section seeks to contextualise the LGBTI
7
 human rights 
discourse development in international law and the implications they have for developing 
domestic laws in South Africa that is cognisant of LGBTI people.  
3.2.1. Specific rights 
The emancipation of LGBTI people globally remains contested both overtly and covertly. 
Ideals that accompany emancipation is that of agency and autonomy. Many LGBTI people 
are still not able to fully live liberated lives that entitle them to standards of living and 
citizenship claims equal to that heterosexual cisgender people. They remain the subjects of 
institutional, social and legal discrimination. In addition, their dignity is continuously violated 
by measures that infringe their privacy, family and home. Ironically, international law seeks 
to protect all people. The following subsections engage various human rights critically, from 
an international law perspective as they relate to the experiences of post facto same-sex 
couples.  
                                                          
4
  Giberga, S. (The Daily Signal) ‘International jurists: Marriage is between a man and a woman’ (20 March 
2013) available at http://www.dailysignal.com/2013/03/20/international-jurists-marriage-is-between-a-
man-and-a-woman/. 
 
5
  United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner ‘Born free and Equal: sexual orientation 
and gender identity in international human rights law’ (2012) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/BornFreeAndEqualLowRes.pdf accessed 18 August 2014. 
 
6
  Corrêa, S. & Muntarbhorn, V. An activist’s guide to the Yogyakarta Principles (2010) 80; See discussions 
on United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) and the Yogyakarta 
Principles (See 3.2.1. – 3.2.2.2.). 
 
7
  International Human Rights Law predominantly refers to the LGBT community. However, in this paper 
due recognition will be given to intersex bodies who are also marginalised and vulnerable due to not 
fitting the heteronormative binary mould of construction in society. Hence, this group also needs to be 
brought into greater visibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
3.2.1.1.    Freedom, equality, dignity and non-discrimination 
Many of the international instruments South Africa is signatory to contains a non-
discriminatory clause whether it uses the word ‘distinction’ in reference to ‘Otherness’ or 
mentions non-discrimination expressly.
8
 Non-discrimination as a human rights imperative is 
typically associated with the rights to freedom, equality and dignity. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
9
 (UDHR) provides that the application of 
international human rights law be guided by the principles of universality and non-
discrimination.
10
 It emphasises the value that ‘all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights.’11 The implication of this rights assertion is thus that LGBTI people may 
also invoke the right to freedom from discrimination.
12
 Consequently, States such as South 
Africa, which are signatories to the UDHR, are therefore bound to ensure that their laws, 
policies and programmes are not discriminatory.
13
 Yet, in stark contradiction and perhaps at 
times justified, what is considered universal is regularly contested by States invoking cultural  
  
                                                          
8
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) resolution 2200A (XXI) adopted by the General 
assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976. Art2 
provides that States are bound to ensuring that all individuals in its territory are able to access the rights 
enshrined in the ICCPR without any distinction on various listed and unlisted grounds. International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) resolution 2200A (XXI) adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976. ICESCR 
(1966) arts2, 3 and 26. Art2 provides that: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination on 
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.’ Art3 focuses on ‘equality’. It provides that State Parties undertake 
to ensure that all men and women enjoy equal benefits under the Covenant. Art26 provides that 
everyone is equal before the law. This article also puts a responsibility on the State to ensure that 
discrimination is prohibited. 
 
9
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) resolution 217 A (III) adopted by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations (UN) on 10 December 1948. 
 
10
  UDHR (1948), art1. 
 
11
  UDHR (1948), art1. 
 
12
  International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2013) 45. 
 
13
  International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2013) 45. 
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relativism and contesting what they deem as ‘western norms and values’ imposed on them.14  
However, within the rights discourse for LGBTI freedom, equality, dignity and non-
discrimination such contestation merely seeks to confirm oppressive positions held by States 
regarding non-heteronormative existence.  
According to the UDHR everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms as provided for in the 
Declaration without distinction
15
 and that everyone is equal before the law and entitled to 
equal protection of the law.
16
 Contextualising this freedom, equality, dignity and non-
discrimination, it also provides that ‘men’ and ‘women’ of full age have the right to marry 
voluntary and found a family subject to the protection of the State.
17
 Such an assertion, 
although progressive on paper, is still unrealisable for many LGBTI people as the 
construction of who is entitled to make equality claims is strained by the limitations of the 
heteronormative conceptualisation and assumptions of rights and human existence within 
international law. The gendered usage of language to articulate rights and position right-
bearers are indicative of such constraints. International instruments still largely refer to 
human beings as being either male or female and man or woman, which in turn renders  
  
                                                          
14
  See generally Harris-Short, S. ‘International human rights law: Imperialism, inept and ineffective? Cultural 
relativism and the United Nations Convention on the rights of the child’ (2003) 25(1) Human Rights 
Quarterly; See generally Hagland, P. ‘International theory and LGBT politics: Testing the limits of a human 
rights-based strategy’ (1997) 3(4) GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies; See generally Perry, M.J. 
‘Are human rights universal? The relativist challenges and related matters’ (1997) 19(3) Human Rights 
Quarterly; See generally Zechenter, E.M. ‘In the name of culture: Cultural relativism and the abuse of the 
individual’ (1997) 53(3) Journal of Anthropological Research; See generally Brennan, K. ‘The influence of 
cultural relativism on international human rights law: Female circumcision as a case study’ (1989) 7 Law 
and Inequality. 
 
15
  UDHR (1948), art2. 
 
16
  UDHR (1948), art7. 
 
17
  UDHR (1948) arts16(1) and (2); ICCPR (1966) arts23 and 17(2). Art23 recognises the right of all men and 
women of marriageable age to marry and found a family and that the family is the most natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and henceforth entitled to State-protection. Art17(2) provides the 
following: ‘Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attack’. 
Art17(2) indirectly puts the onus of protecting this right on the ‘law’; See White Paper on families in South 
Africa (2012) 31.  
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invisible all other sexes and genders that exist.
18
 These ‘Others’ would, amongst many other 
culturally relative and different sexes and genders, be that of intersex and transgender people. 
If freedom, equality and non-discrimination rights affirmation is a fundamental objective of 
the UDHR for all, then language usage and how language construct hierarchical identities 
itself needs interrogation. If not, the UDHR’s objectives will remain a pipe-dream for LGBTI 
people and reinforce heteronormativity as a truth, the only truth, about human existence and 
intimate relationships. 
South Africa is a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
19
 
(ICCPR). It is bound to ensuring that all individuals in its territory are able to access the 
rights enshrined in the ICCPR without any distinction on various listed and unlisted 
grounds.
20
 As can be deduced from the formulation of article 2 of the ICCPR, it is not a 
numerous clauses.  The grounds upon which an individual may be discriminated against are 
open. According to a report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
drafters of the ICCPR left the article open intentionally for new forms of discrimination that 
may arise.
21
 New forms of discrimination that has been acknowledged by the Human Rights 
Committee is that of ‘sexual orientation’. In the communication of Toonen v Australia, the 
Human Rights Committee held that States are under an obligation to protect individuals from 
discrimination based on their sexual orientation.
22
 In mutual support, article 26 provides that 
                                                          
18
  Ratele, K. ‘Looks: Subjectivity as commodity’ (2011) 25(4) Agenda 93. Language thus introduces us to the 
processes of exclusion and inclusion and the ways in which one thinks about the self, others and 
relationships. As an instrument of power language is used to legitimise certain human phenomena, 
relations and identities whilst at the same time rendering invisible and silencing others that should not be 
shown, done, revealed, expressed or enacted; See generally Duncan, N. (1993) ‘Discourses of racism’ 
unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Psychology, University of the Western Cape, Bellville; 
See generally Durrheim, K. ‘Social constructionism, discourse, and psychology’ (1997) 27 (3) South African 
Journal of Psychology . Language is directly implicated in the formation of cultural reality and is therefore 
not merely a representation of it. It is formative and not merely expressive of a physical reality. Hence, 
words and images do not only mirror the external world but help create it. 
 
19
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) resolution 2200A (XXI) adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976. 
 
20
  ICCPR (1966), art2. 
 
21
  19
th
 session of the Human Rights Council ‘Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General: 
Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual 
orientation and gender identity’ Agenda Item 2 of 8. 
 
22
  Toonen v Australia communication No. 88/1992 (CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992). 
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‘all are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law.’23 This article 
enables the law to operate in a way that prohibits discrimination and protects individuals from 
various forms of discrimination including ‘sexual orientation’. 
In General Comment 20, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights observed 
that ‘sexual orientation’ is included under ‘other status.’24 Hence, State Parties must ensure 
that the fact that a person’s sexual orientation differs from the norm, which is heterosexual, 
does not create a barrier to them accessing the rights enshrined in the Covenant.
25
 In addition, 
‘gender identity’ has also been recognised as a ground upon which a person may not be 
discriminated against.
26
 In coming to this conclusion, the Committee relied upon the non-
binding international instrument, the Yogyakarta Principles
27
 as a source of guidance on the 
understanding of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ in international human rights 
law.
28
  
Evidently, the Human Rights Committee in their general comments has made it apparent that 
States are obliged to protect everyone within their respective territories from discrimination. 
The fact that someone is LGBTI identifying may not be used as a ground to limit their 
entitlement to enjoy all the human rights which accrues to him or her equally with their 
heterosexual and cisgender counterparts.
29
 In light of this, the question becomes whether post 
facto same-sex couples are able to equally enjoy their right to found an intimate personal 
relationship and family when compared to heterosexual and cisgender couples who remain 
heterosexual and cisgender for the duration of their marriage under the Marriage Act? 
                                                          
23
  ICCPR (1966), art26. 
 
24
  42
nd
 session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 2 July 2009 ‘General Comment 
20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art.2, para.2, of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ Agenda Item 3 of 10.  
 
25
  International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2013) 46. 
 
26
  General Comment 20 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2 July 2009) 10; See 
International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2013) 46. 
 
27
  Yogyakarta Principles: principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual 
orientation and gender identity as compiled in Indonesia March 2007; See 3.2.2.2. for further discussion. 
 
28
  International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2013) 46; It is 
comforting to note that there is a commitment from UN bodies to use non-binding guiding instruments 
such as the Yogyakarta Principles to assist in the interpretation of international human rights.  
 
29
  International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2013) 48. 
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3.2.1.2.   Prohibition on arbitrary and unlawful interference of privacy, family,   
    home or correspondence  
The UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR all provide that everyone has the right to be protected in 
law from any arbitrary and unlawful interference with his [or her] privacy, family, home or 
correspondence and that the State has a duty to protect the family as a natural and 
fundamental group unit within society.
30
  In a General Comment on article 23, the ICCPR 
concluded that the definition of what constitutes a ‘family’ may differ from State to State and 
region to region.
31
 Bearing all these rights in mind, the UDHR also expressly states that no 
right contained in it may be interpreted by any State in such a way that it would destroy these 
rights that accrue to people.
32
 However, in South Africa, instead of equally offering 
protection to post facto same-sex marriages, the State have subjected them to arbitrary and 
irregular State interference (administration action) whose legality is challenged by this thesis, 
subjecting them to compulsory or forced divorces that put these couples at great risk. The 
State, through the actions of the Department of Home Affairs, have unwantedly imposed 
themselves and made adverse determinations on the lives of these married couples with no 
due regard to their right to privacy, family and home as envisioned by the UDHR, ICCPR and 
ICESCR.
33
 This is a clear dereliction of their responsibility to protect and preserve the family 
as the fundamental group unit within society.   
By reading these developments in conjunction with one another, it would seem as if a prima 
facie case exist that post facto same-sex marriages and families may find protection under the 
ICCPR should the couple fall within the territory or jurisdiction of a state that recognises 
                                                          
30
  UDHR (1948), arts12 and 16(3); ICCPR (1966). Art17(1) provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his [or her] privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attack on his [or her] honour and reputation’; ICESCR (1966). Art10(1) stipulates that State 
Parties must offer the widest possible protection and assistance to the family unit which is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society. It also stresses the importance of the family unit in relation to the 
well-being of children; Convention on the Rights of the Child resolution 44/25 adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990. The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) reaffirms the position held by both the ICCPR and ICESCR that 
State Parties to the Convention recognises the family as the fundamental group in society which creates a 
natural environment that is conducive to the well-being of children and the family at large. Hence, this 
unit is entitled to protection and assistance by the State. 
 
31
  Corrêa, S. & Muntarbhorn, V. An activist’s guide to the Yogyakarta Principles (2010) 80. 
 
32
  UDHR (1948), art30. 
 
33  Legal Resources Centre & Gender Dynamix Briefing paper: Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 
No. 49 of 2003 (2014) 24. 
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same-sex marriages.   In the case of South Africa, which recognises same-sex marriages, the 
question becomes: ‘Does the different sexual orientation and/or gender identity of the 
partners justify the coercion of post facto same-sex couples to divorce? 
3.2.2. Specific instruments 
In positioning post facto same-sex marriages in South Africa, two important international 
instruments need discussion for the role they play in constructing an LGBTI political 
landscape and right discourse. They are important for two very different reasons. The African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), the regional binding document to which 
South Africa is signatory, is discussed in the context of its seemingly passive-regressive 
position around LGBTI rights in Africa. Juxtaposing this binding regional instrument is the 
non-binding most progressive international instrument, the Yogyakarta Principles, an 
instrument expansively addressing LGBTI rights, to which South Africa is also signatory. 
This section explores the relevance and importance of these two instruments in relation to 
post facto same-sex marriages in South Africa. 
3.2.2.1.   African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
Before discussion is rendered on the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
(ACHPR),
34
 mention needs to be made that South Africa, being an African country, is light-
years ahead of the LGBTI human rights discourse in Africa. However, the relevance of 
engaging this Charter is founded upon its influence in the domestic politics of States in 
relation to shaping ‘acceptable’ sexual and gender identities in Africa. As a regional human 
rights structure, mandated to protect the human rights of all people, the African Commission 
on Human and People’s Rights (ACmHPR)35 have struggled to prove its commitment to the 
protection of LGBTI human rights. Analyst ascribe this to three major challenges, which 
include the structure of the ACHPR in itself, the reluctance amongst signatories to advance 
LGBTI human rights (with nations mining the texts for ways in which domestic laws can 
undermine the Charter) and lastly, a lack of human and financial resources.
36
 This has 
                                                          
34
      African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights CAB/LEG/67/3 adopted by the OAU on 27 June 
         1981 and entered into force 21 October 1986. 
 
35
  The ACmHPR was established by virtue of the operation of art30 of the ACHPR. The Commission is 
mandated to protect and promote human and people’s rights and interpret the provisions of the Charter. 
 
36
  Mittelstaedt, E. ‘Safeguarding the rights of sexual minorities: The incremental and legal approaches to 
enforcing international human rights obligations’ (2008) 9(1) Chicago Journal of International Law 363. 
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resulted in same-sex marriages not particularly having reached the top of the human rights 
agenda in Africa, with human rights bodies still largely being focussed on ensuring that 
LGBTI people are not killed, tortured or imprisoned.
37
  
The ACHPR affirms the family as the natural unit and basis for society in line with the 
ICCPR and ICESCR.
38
 It also puts the onus on the State to protect families and to take care 
of the physical health and morale of the family. Although article 2 of the Charter provides 
that the criminalisation of consensual same-sex practices is not compatible with it, the 
Commission still has a long way to go in deciding its approach to the LGBTI human rights 
dilemma in Africa.
39
  
Currently, Africa, as a continent is projected to the world as being homophobic and 
transphobic. Sigamoney and Epprecht, however, question how knowledge about 
homosexuality, gender non-conformity and African identities has been and are contextually 
constructed.
40
 However, the Coalition of African Lesbians
41
 (CAL) correctly recognises and 
seeks to address the complexities in structuring arguments around African LGBTI identities, 
by emphasising that Africa is diverse in its morality and that moralities are as varied as the 
continent is different.
42
 Hence, it would be incorrect to describe Africa as having one 
monolithic common morality that automatically rejects LGBTI people and their intimate 
relationships. It is, however, States justifying LGBTI human rights violations by invoking the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
37
  Ettelbrick, P.L. & Shapiro, J. ‘Are we on the path to liberation now?: Same-sex marriages at Home and 
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39
  ACHPR, art2. Article 2 provides that ‘Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and 
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  CAL is an organisation founded on the philosophy of African Radical Feminism and consist of a network of 
organisations that work to transform Africa into a continent where LGBT people experience the full 
enjoyment of their human rights. Find more information at http://www.cal.org.za/new/?page-id=587. 
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  See generally Wilets, J.D. ‘From divergence to convergence: A comparative and international law analysis 
of LGBTI rights in context of race and colonialism’ (2011) 21 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
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doctrine of cultural relativism that holds strong to their oppositional human rights viewpoints, 
often undermining their own legitimacy.
43
 Instead of simplistically rejecting non-
heteronormative sexualities and gender identities as unAfrican, homophobic and transphobic, 
African governments should invest in historically understanding African sexualities and 
gender identities indigenously, in African contexts that existed prior to colonialisation.
44
  
Homophobic and transphobic African governments, those who play gatekeeper to who can 
access human rights, should question the legacy of colonialism not merely based on the 
politics of race, or class, or gender etc., but also that of indoctrinating Africa’s peoples to 
subscribe to the ideology and politics of domination that places compulsory heterosexuality, a 
binary sex-gender construction, homophobia, transphobia, imported belief-systems such as 
Christianity, Judiasm and Islam as central features to capitalism.
45
  In legitimising this 
argument, the ACmHPR, in the communication Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia,
46
 
held that limiting the rights of Others cannot solely be justified by majoritarianism (or 
majority morality) and popular will.
47
 Ndashe thus proposes that Charter morality requires 
that the ACmHPR extend its protective shield to include sexual minorities.
48
  
The ACHPR and ACmHPR are perpetuating institutional homophobia and transphobia 
through their silence. Silence creates an enabling environment for people, including those in 
                                                          
43
  Wilets, J.D. ‘From divergence to convergence: A comparative and international law analysis of LGBTI 
rights in context of race and colonialism’ (2011) 21 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 
632 & 35; Eskridge, W.N. Jr. ‘The history of same-sex marriage’ 79 VA. L. REV. (1993) 1419, 1437 – 46, 
1453 – 69, 1510. Research has found that same-sex unions and transgender unions have historically 
existed at various times and in a variety of ways in societies. They existed in 19
th
 century Nigeria and in 
other African societies such as the Azande, Siwah, el Garah, Basotho, Venda, Mesu, Phalaborwa and 
Bantu peoples. 
 
44
  See generally Tamale, S. ‘Confronting the politics of nonconforming sexualities in Africa’ (2013) 56(2) 
African Studies Review; See Tamale, S. ‘Researching and theorising sexualities in Africa’ In Tamale, S. 
African sexualities: A reader (2011). 
 
45
  Wilets, J.D. ‘From divergence to convergence: A comparative and international law analysis of LGBTI 
rights in context of race and colonialism’ (2011) 21 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 
632; See generally Pharr, S. Homophobia: A weapon of sexism (1997); See generally Rich, A. ‘Compulsory 
heterosexuality and lesbian existence’ (1980) 5(4) Signs. 
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positions of power such as civil servants, living in seemingly progressive States such as 
South Africa, to exercise their power in a manner that prejudice post facto same-sex couples, 
in the name of upholding pure African sexual and gender identities. 
3.2.2.2. Yogyakarta Principles: Paving the way forward in the development of an 
 international LGBTI human rights discourse  
In contrast to the ACHPR and ACmHPR’s relative silence on LGBTI related matters, the 
Yogyakarta Principles is a set of international principles relating to sexual orientation and 
gender identity crafted in response to non-normative sexualities and gender identities 
remaining a battleground within the United Nations (UN) and global frameworks and 
systems.
49
 This is exacerbated by certain governments standing in opposition and defiance of 
UN expert and political bodies who seek to advance LGBTI human rights globally.
50
 In light 
of this contestation, it, therefore, comes as no surprise that the instrument is non-binding and 
serves as guidelines on how to apply international human rights law. Although it is non-
binding, this instrument serves an important purpose, which is to coherently and 
comprehensively identify the obligations of States to respect, protect and fulfil the human 
rights of all persons, irrespective of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
51
 South 
Africa made representation as a States Party to the document. In its introduction, the 
document brilliantly provides that a person’s sexual orientation and/or gender identity forms 
an integral part of their dignity, [self-determination] and humanity.
52
 Hence, it should never 
be used as grounds for discrimination. 
Central to this document is its awareness about how LGBTI bodies are policed by states and 
societies using custom, law and violence to seek control over how LGBTI-identifying people 
                                                          
49
  Saiz, I. ‘Bracketing sexuality: Human Rights and sexual orientation: A decade of development and denial 
at the UN’ (2004) 7(2) Health and Human Rights 48. 
 
50
  See generally Kao, G.Y. Grounding human rights in a pluralist world (2011); See generally Klabbers, J. & 
Piiparinen, T. Normative pluralism and international law: Exploring global governance (2013). 
 
51
  O’Flaherty, M. & Fisher, J. ‘Sexual orientation, gender identity and international human rights law: 
Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles’ (2008) 8(2) Human Rights Law Review 207 & 33. The 
Yogyakarta Principles has a tripartite function which focuses on mapping the experiences of people with 
diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, assisting with the articulation of LGBTI interests in 
international human rights law as clear as possible and spelling out the obligations of States in detail in 
order to implement the human rights obligation which they bare. 
 
52
  Yogyakarta Principles (2007), principle 6; Yogyakarta Principles (2007), principle 3. It provides that: 
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experience personal relationships.
53
 It affirms the great strides made in developing an 
international human rights law discourse in the international arena.
54
 However, with regard to 
shaping a discourse that can respect and protect multiple family units including those who are 
formed by parents who identify as LGBTI, the system is but in its infantile stage. Ideally, one 
would like to see the Yogyakarta Principles become more entrenched within international law 
in order to vindicate LGBTI rights more authoritatively, comprehensibly and effectively. 
However, the fact that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights already made 
use of the Yogyakarta Principles is indicative that it might progressively play a bigger role in 
determining LGBTI rights globally, in future.
55
 
As a point of departure, Principle 1 affirms and expands on the current international law 
position under the UDHR by stating that all human beings regardless of their sexual 
orientation and/or gender identity are born free and equal and are entitled to the full 
enjoyment of their human rights.
56
 In elaborating more on the substance of this principle, it is 
stated that States need to be proactive by integrating a pluralistic approach into its policies 
and decision-making that recognises the interrelatedness and indivisibility of human 
existence including their sexual orientation and gender identity.
57
 Hence, States need to adopt 
appropriate legislation and other measures to ensure that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity is prohibited in both the public and private sphere.
58
 If 
measures are taken to advance the interest of the LGBTI then such measures will not be seen 
as discriminatory.
59
 States need also to take into account other forms of discrimination that 
may intersect with sexual orientation and gender identity.
60
 
                                                          
53
  Yogyakarta Principles (2007), principle 6.  
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development of various discourses around different sexualities and gender identities. 
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In the content of Principle 2, discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity is 
explained as taking the forms of distinguishing, excluding, restricting or preferring a person 
based on their sexual orientation and/or gender identity.
61
 
Principle 24 provides that everyone has the right to found a family.
62
 In this context, a person 
may not be denied their right to found a family based on their sexual orientation and/or 
gender identity. Principle 24 includes the following aspects. Amongst other matters addressed 
it includes the need for the law and administration of States to ensure that no family is 
subjected to discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity, that the best 
interest of the child be a primary concern and that different-sex and same-sex couples share 
the same benefits and obligations in States which allow for same-sex couples to get married.  
3.3.      Conclusion 
Many countries, in contrast to what international law provides, compromise equality and 
dignity for post facto same-sex couples, by mandating them to divorce where at least one 
partner undergoes gender affirmation.
63
 South Africa is not an isolated case. What sets South 
Africa apart from other States has been its historical context of oppression under the regime 
of apartheid and its commitment and reimagining of a country where the most marginalised 
of people, groups and communities are able to meaningfully and dignifiedly part-take in the 
life of the nation.   
In realising the true effect of the power politics in identity formation, Chapter 4 will analyse 
the South African legal landscape both historically and contemporary in order to produce a 
contextually viable argument for the protection of the right of post facto same-sex couples to 
remain married under the Marriage Act. 
                                                          
61
  Yogyakarta Principles (2007). 
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4. CHAPTER 4: DOMESTIC LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS: AN EXISTING LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERESTS OF POST 
FACTO SAME-SEX MARRIAGES  
4.1.      Introduction 
South Africa’s legal landscape has not been the most accommodating to persons who identify 
and lives outside the heteronormative-cisgender-monogamous-Christian ideology of 
acceptable coupling worthy of social endorsement through marriage and the legal protection 
that accompanies it. The doors of marriage and the accompanying legal protection for non-
normative intimate relationships has remained shut for a long period of time, with 
polygamous relationships and same-sex relationships (particularly cisgender same-sex 
relationships) only having attained legal recognition in recent times.
1
 However, such legal 
recognition was given outside the scope of the dreadfully guarded Marriage Act. In practice, 
the Marriage Act still exclusively apply to heteronormative-cisgender-monogamous couples. 
The challenge of inequality is located in the way it is tied up within hierarchies, that are 
coupled with exclusion and disadvantage, preventing ‘difference’ from being affirmed as a 
positive social feature.
2
 This chapter focuses on a South African LGBTI human rights 
jurisprudence and the implication it has for advancing the interests of post facto same-sex 
couples.  
4.2.       Historical context 
South Africa has a long, painful and pervasive history of dehumanisation based on negative 
stereotypes of non-dominant groups in society particularly as it relates to the relationships 
that exist between sexuality, gender identity, race and intimate relationships.
3
 When people 
have set beliefs on what is biological and natural this may give rise to an attack on the self-
worth of groups different to the norm.
4
 Reflecting on South Africa’s past, this is exactly what 
occurred under the apartheid regime. Apartheid systematically undermined and marginalised 
                                                          
1
        Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998; Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
 
2  Albertyn, C. ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 260; National 
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people in overtly discriminatory ways by passing laws prohibiting interracial marriage and 
same-sex consensual conduct and relationships through criminalisation.
5
 Although the form 
of oppression is different for both these groups, the principle of oppression works in exactly 
the same way by stereotyping certain people or groups of people, then enforcing prejudice 
against such people or groups and consequently formulating discriminatory practices against 
them which ultimately becomes justified through institutional mechanisms such as 
psychology, medicine, religion, culture and of course the law. The institutional mechanisms 
thus are instrumental in maintaining and reinforcing the dominant ideologies and narratives. 
4.2.1. An alternative narrative:  Legal position of transsexual marriages in a pre-
constitutional dispensation 
Under apartheid, the rights of homosexual and transsexual people, in particular, although not 
excluding other non-normative sexualities and gender identities, were limited to the extent 
that they were not allowed to assert their rights to identity and to have their intimate 
relationships legally protected by acquiring State recognition by operation of the Marriage 
Act.  
An historical account of transsexual rights in South Africa indicates that prior to 1963, the 
Department of the Interior, now the Department of Home Affairs, altered the birth register of 
persons who had undergone gender affirmation surgery on account of medical intervention 
without having been empowered to do so in terms of the existing Act.
6
 Subsequently, the first 
codification of the alteration of a person’s sex description came about in section 7B of the 
Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act of 1963.
7
 Section 7B legalised gender 
affirmation surgery retrospectively. This meant that persons who had undergone gender 
affirmation before 1963 could, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Health, legally 
assert their affirmed gender and have their sex description amended in the birth register. 
                                                          
5
  Posel, D. ‘”Getting the nation talking about sex”: Reflections on the politics of sexuality and nation-
building in post-apartheid South Africa’ In Tamale, S. ed African sexualties: A reader (2011) 130.  
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  See Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act 81 of 1963. 
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  Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act 81 of 1963. This section provided that the secretary for the 
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if he or she has undergone gender affirmation surgery and only if such amendment was recommended by 
the secretary for health, now the Minister of Health. Consequently, the alteration of sex description in a 
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the department for the interior before section 7B was included in the Act. 
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A counter-progressive move was made in 1976 when the scope and effect of section 7B was 
challenged in the case of W v W.
8
 Relying on the 1970 English case Corbett v Corbett,
9
 the 
court held that a marriage concluded in terms of the Marriage Act between a biological 
(cisgender) man and a transsexual woman was invalid. Regrettably the implication of this 
decision was that transsexual people were excluded from the protection of the Marriage Act 
on account of their gender identity.  The effect of W v W was that it took away any possibility 
that post-operative transsexuals could be recognised as members of their post-operative sex in 
South Africa.
10
 It took away the legal effect which section 7B could have had in that it 
appeared to provide that gender affirmation surgery was not contra bonos mores and that it 
was intended to recognise transsexuals for all aspects of South African law. 
It has been stated that ‘the court takes a fatalistic approach by ignoring the real effects of 
human, social and physical development by adopting a mere biological approach to sex.’11 
                                                          
8  See W v W 1976 2 SA 308 (W). The case dealt with the determination of a post-operative female 
person’s sexual identity for the purpose of marriage and divorce. It should be noted that in order for a 
decree of divorce to be granted it must first be proven that a valid marriage was contracted. The court’s 
reasoning was that at the time when the ‘purported’ marriage was concluded, a marriage was 
constituted as a union between a [biological] man and woman. Their marriage therefore depended on 
whether the plaintiff was a biological woman at the time the marriage was concluded. The law did not 
allow for persons of the same [biological] sex to get married. In determining the plaintiff’s sex, the court 
asked the question as to what the sex was of the plaintiff prior to the operation and whether such an 
operation in deed changed the plaintiff’s sex to that of the opposite assigned at birth. If it did not then 
the marriage was invalid. It concluded that the criteria for the purpose of marriage must be biologically 
based on the essential heterosexual character of a marriage in terms of the English case of Corbett v 
Corbett (1970) 2 All E.R. 33 (P.D.A.) 48. 
9
  Corbett v Corbett (1970) 2 All E.R. 33 (P.D.A.) 48. As per Corbett v Corbett male chromosomes, gonads and 
genitalia cannot reproduce that which a naturally-born woman can. Thus, if a person fails to prove that 
his or her chromosomes, gonadal and genitals are that of the chosen gender, all operative interventions 
are ignored. Consequently, the biological constitution of a person is fixed at birth, at the latest, and this 
cannot be changed by either the natural development of organs associated with the opposite sex or 
medical or surgical intervention. Thus, the plaintiff’s operation could not alter ‘his’ true sex. For these 
reasons the marriage was declared void because the plaintiff was at all times deemed to be a male who 
was married to another male. The judge ordered that the plaintiff has no claim for divorce and the 
division of the joint estate. The judge also ordered that the marriage be annulled on account that the 
summons be appropriately amended; The precedent set by W v W was reaffirmed in the 1981 case of 
Sims v Sims 1981 (4) SA 186 (D). In the case a divorce action was brought by the husband against his 
purported wife. He alleged that the defendant was at all material times a male and that a valid civil 
marriage could only be validly concluded if the parties the marriage was respectively one man and one 
woman. Two persons of the same sex could not legally be married. Thus, no valid marriage was 
concluded. The court held that the purported marriage was null and void. 
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  See South African Law Commission (Project 52) Report on the investigation into the legal consequences of 
sexual realignment and related matters (1995) 18. 
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  Smith, O.K. ‘Transsexualism, sex reassignment surgery, and the law’ (1971) Cornell Law Review 963. 
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This excludes the essence of what constitutes human existence and the ability to affect one’s 
own destiny. Thus, a marriage should not be declared void unless it never existed in the 
minds of the parties.
12
 
Subsequently, in 1992, the Births and Deaths Registration Act
13
 repealed the Births, 
Marriages and Deaths Registration Act of 1963.
14
 It made no provision for the recognition of 
a persons affirmed sex. This vacuum created in the law by omitting transsexual people is 
indicative of the little importance lawmakers place on the lives of people from non-normative 
sexualities and gender identities. In 1993, section 33(3) was inserted into the Births and 
Deaths Registration Act.
15
 It provided that if a person was in the process of undergoing 
gender affirmation surgery before the commencement of the new Act, that he or she may 
apply upon completion of such surgery to have his or her sex amended in the birth register 
under section 7B of the old Act. The legal effect of this section was that transsexual people 
could once more amend their sex status in the birth register and be recognised as a person of 
the opposite sex to their sex assigned at birth. However, even with this affirmation, no 
evidence suggest that the precedent set by W v W was legally contested between 1976 and 
1993.  
                                                          
12
  Smith, O.K. ‘Transsexualism, sex reassignment surgery, and the law’ (1971) Cornell Law Review 1007 – 8. 
This applies to both transsexual and other types of marriages. Yet, even though this seem to have been 
the intention of the legislature, the question could even be posed here already as to whether or not the 
legislature intended that couples who were married at the time under the Marriage Act could claim legal 
protection for their marriage if one underwent gender affirmation surgery and had their birth register 
amended, conforming the marriage to a same sex marriage? In such a case would gender affirmation 
surgery and an amendment to one’s birth register have constituted an act contra bonos mores for the 
purpose of marriage? Such a determination at the time would have been vital as to establish the position 
of spouses to such a marriage. W v W established that based on biology a trans-person would still be seen 
as a person of his or her assigned biological sex at birth and not the affirmed sex. Thus, if he or she had to 
marry someone of his or her birth sex, the purported marriage would have been void because it would 
conform to a same-sex union. Inversely so, the question becomes would the regime at the time then 
have acknowledged that a post facto homosexual marriage due to gender affirmation surgery, having 
been entered initially by two opposite sex biological bodies, would remain legally married as W v W 
rejects a persons affirmed sex.  
 
13
  Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992. S7 of the new Act made no provision for the alteration and 
recognition of a person’s sex description if persons underwent gender affirmation surgery. Section 7B 
was not re-enacted in the new Act. Therefore, if a person was in the process of gender affirmation 
surgery, he or she could not legally affect an amendment to his or her birth register. 
 
14
  South African Law Commission (Project 52) Report on the investigation into the legal consequences of 
sexual realignment and related matters (1995) 18. 
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Bearing all these legal developments in mind, no relevant information pertaining to the 
invalidation of post facto same-sex marriages was apparent during the period 1963 up until 
1994. The lack of formal entries or codification can be ascribed to various reasons. However, 
it does not indicate that post facto same-sex couples were not subjected to compulsory or 
forced divorces during apartheid at the instance of the Department of the Interior.  Only in 
1995 did the South African Law Commission publish a report that specifically addressed the 
legal position of post facto same-sex couples.
16
  
The report states that ‘a spouse undergoing sex change procedure(s) must be seen as 
attempting to bring the existing marriage to an end.’17 It recommends that a party may 
successfully seek a divorce on account of the other spouse undergoing gender affirmation 
surgery during the marriage because the gender affirmation surgery should be seen as an 
attempt to terminate the existing marriage.
18
 It was also recommended that a sex change not 
be allowed during the subsistence of a marriage especially when such marriage had produced 
children.
19
 Very direct, yet, these narrow assertions do not address whether a post facto same-
sex marriage is, or ought to be, valid when  both the cisgender and transsexual spouse want to 
remain married. It also does not address whether the State automatically acquires a right to 
invalidate such a marriage or whether the State can force or compel such a couple to apply 
for a divorce decree.  
It is evident upon scrutinising the complexities around sexualities and gender identities that 
the lengthy report makes recommendations based upon heteronormative, cigender, 
monogamous and conservative assumptions around the nuclear family. These 
recommendations have been and seemingly remain detrimental to the stability and wellbeing 
of post facto same-sex marriages and parties by negating the real effects that a compulsory or 
forced divorce may have on the spouses. It makes a determination on the status of the 
marriage but makes no recommendations on how to mitigate the adverse effects that comes 
                                                          
16
  See South African Law Commission (Project 52) Report on the investigation into the legal consequences of 
sexual realignment and related matters (1995). 
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  South African Law Commission (Project 52) Report on the investigation into the legal consequences of 
sexual realignment and related matters (1995) 26. 
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  South African Law Commission (Project 52) Report on the investigation into the legal consequences of 
sexual realignment and related matters (1995) 26. 
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  South African Law Commission (Project 52) Report on the investigation into the legal consequences of 
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part and parcel thereto. For one, it does not indicate whether the marriage is void ab initio, 
whether from the moment the transsexual spouse realises his or her cross-gender identity or 
whether from the moment he or she embarks on a journey of realigning their sex with their 
gender identity. The report fails to discuss the nuanced intricacies coincidental to positioning 
transsexuality within the law. What it has however done is to rigidly juxtapose transsexuality 
with the law, leaving little space for flexibility and (re)negotiation.  
From being legally invisible, to obtaining limited legal recognition, to being blatantly 
omitted, and ones again included, and then again being provided with vague possibilities, it is 
clear that the lived realities of transsexual people were left at the mercy of the State who 
exercised its power adversely and inconsistently just because it could, without due regard as 
to the adverse impact it had on transsexual people. However, even though the past indicates a 
narrative of struggle, humiliation and inhumane treatment; the present and the feature looks a 
bit more promising under an ever evolving international human rights framework and 
progressive domestic legislation inspired by a superbly drafted Constitution. 
4.3.      South African Constitution: A safety-net for the marginalised 
Forcing or coercing post facto same-sex couples to divorce under the Marriage Act and 
having their union reregistered under the Civil Union Act brings about various ethical and 
constitutional issues.  
4.3.1. Transformation and ideological contestations 
‘Gay’ rights activists and advocates alike have found themselves in an ideological tug of war. 
On the one end there has been a strong fight for marriage equality in which civil unions and 
domestic partnerships for same-sex couples have been out rightly rejected as an ineffective 
substitute for marriage relegating same-sex couples to second-class citizenship.
20
 On the 
other end, same-sex couples have endorsed civil unions and domestic partnerships as an 
alternative to marriage as an institution separate to the oppressive history of traditional 
marriage. The context of this thesis is founded on neither ideologies nor positions as 
mentioned above but premised solely on the protection of a marriage that post facto same-sex 
couples wish to continue in terms of the Marriage Act.   
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  Persad, G. ‘What marriage law can learn from citizenship law (and vice versa)’ (2013) 22 Law & Sexuality 
109. 
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…the idea of transformation is a politically and legally contested space in which the possibilities 
of substantive equality/transformation are limited by “inclusionary” approaches and remedies or 
bolstered by those that are truly “transformatory.”
21
 
The above statement presupposes that should an individual or a group of people be excluded 
from legal protection due to the operation of a particular status quo that the substantive 
equality which is sought will be limited to the extent that the status quo is able to include the 
excluded into its ambit without materially being affected. In this manner, the status quo 
subjects the ‘difference’ to assimilation and hence is not subjected to transformation. 
Alternatively, transformation could also mean radically dismantling the status quo in its 
entirety but this may come at a different cost for minority groups. 
It also correctly holds that social inclusion does not necessarily amount to social 
transformation. More likely social inclusion tends to undermine social transformation by 
pulling some closer to the status quo whilst pushing the margins further for those perceived to 
have a more transgressive agenda. The question being, who of the marginalised are offered 
inclusion, why and at what expense? 
American advocates have unsuccessfully argued that in order to attain greater rights for more 
people, the institution of marriage must be dismantled in its entirety.
22
 However, others have 
argued that obtaining access to the institution of marriage is much more reasonable in order 
to obtain rights. Hence, the intense mobilisation for same-sex marriage rights equal to that of 
opposite-sex couples all around the world, including South Africa, comes as no surprise. 
What does come as a surprise, is the ease with which normative gay and lesbian couples have 
been able to disassociate their struggles from other LGBTI relations that are more 
transgressive when critically reflecting on the status quo. Persad questions whether one can 
pursue access to a status such as marriage within the confines of the status quo while 
                                                          
21
  Albertyn, C. ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 257; See generally 
Botha, H. ‘Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism’ 2002 TSAR 612, 2003 TSAR 20; See 
generally Van der Walt, J. Law and sacrifice: Towards a post-apartheid theory of law (2005). According to 
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simultaneously advocating for the expansion of rights differently for others on the outside.
23
 
It is with this ideological conflict that this thesis has been particularly challenging to write.  
4.3.2. The rights to equality, dignity and freedom 
The South African Constitution affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.
24
  
4.3.2.1. Right to equality 
The equality clause expressly lists ‘sexual orientation’ as a ground upon which a person may 
not be discriminated against.
25
 In addition, ‘gender identity’ has been affirmed by way of the 
Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act as an unlisted ground upon which a person 
may not be discriminated.
26
 Consequently, section 9(2) provides that equality includes the 
full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.
27
 By extension, the right to found a 
family is not expressly protected by the Constitution but by virtue of claiming one’s right to 
equality and dignity.
28
 According to the Constitution if a person is being discriminated 
against based on a listed ground it gives rise to an automatic claim of unfair discrimination 
unless it is proven to be fair.
29
 The fact that post facto same-sex couples are coerced into 
obtaining a decree of divorce under the Marriage Act and ‘remarry’  under the Civil Union 
Act begs the question of whether such an action upholds the right and value of marriage 
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  Persad, G. ‘What marriage law can learn from citizenship law (and vice versa)’ (2013) 22 Law & Sexuality 
105. 
 
24
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), s7(1). 
 
25
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), s9(3). The section provides that ‘the state may not 
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  Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003, s3(2). After having had his or her sex 
description altered legally the person is deemed for all purposes of the law to be a person of the altered 
sex. This may be the case irrespective of the physical embodiment of the person still resembling that of a 
typical male-born person. Hence, a person may not be discriminated against based on his or her ‘gender 
identity’. 
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  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), s9(2). 
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‘equality’ since heterosexual couples married under the Marriage Act are not burdened to do 
the same. Such action stands in stark contradiction with South Africa’s equality 
jurisprudence.  
In Brink v Kitshoff the Constitutional Court held that in cases dealing with substantive 
equality, that it is a requirement to consider the impact of constitutionally relevant 
differentiation on the complainant by taking into account the contextual circumstances of the 
complainant.
30
 Hence, De Vos correctly argues that the contextual or remedial approach 
taken by courts must steer away from creating and maintaining legal and structural 
inequalities between individuals and groups of people based on difference.
31
 
In addressing respect for difference and the advancement of the right to equality, the court 
held in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice that: 
…what the Constitution requires is that the law and public institutions acknowledges the 
variability of human beings and affirm the equal respect and concern that should be shown to all 
as they are. At the very least, what is statistically normal ceases to be the basis for establishing 
what is legally normative. More broadly speaking, the scope of what is constitutionally normal is 
expanded to include the widest range of perspectives and to acknowledge, accommodate and 
accept the largest spread of differences what becomes normal in an open society, then, is not an 
imposed and standardised form of behaviour that refuses to acknowledge difference, but the 
acceptance of the principle of difference itself, which accepts the variability of human 
behaviour.
32
   
The above quote brings about a critical reflection on what it means to assert a right to 
marriage equality for all. Many activists have argued that the goal of achieving marriage 
equality for same-sex couples entailed submitting to being assimilated into mainstream 
institutions.
33
 In order to engage the concept of the constitutional family and the variations of 
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  Brink v Kitshoff 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) para44; See generally Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 
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family formations that are coincidental thereto, lawmakers and law interpreters must critically  
reflect and question to what extent the existing social binary construction of sex, gender, 
sexual orientation and gender identity undermine the variability of human beings and their 
right to substantive equality. Agreeably, what is the norm does not presuppose that it is 
normal. Such an assertion plays into the domain of power and politics as addressed by 
Foucault.  The South African Constitution is particularly clear on affirming the rights to 
freedom, dignity and equality in the context of the politics of power between those 
considering themselves to be superior and worthy of preservation in relation to those 
considered to be and positioned as marginalised and disposable. However, the politics of 
power is pervasive and insidious in the preservation of social hierarchies that are reinforced 
with legal doctrine. For this reason, attention is drawn to the role the law plays in reinforcing 
social hierarchies, especially when addressing sexual and gender transformational 
imperatives.  Though desperately seeking to be progressive or, at least, seeking to appear 
progressive, lawmakers often fall into a normative trap that is rooted in the ideals of the status 
quo. For non-normative sexual and gender identities, this has meant being subjected to the 
construction and effects of homonormativity, largely modelled on heteronormativity.  
4.3.2.2. Right to dignity 
Section 10 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to claim protection and 
respect for their inherent human dignity.
34
 Since human dignity is a vague value it must be 
assessed in light of certain factors as expressed in the Constitutional Court judgement of 
Harksen v Lane.
35
  
Harksen v Lane lists factors to assess the extent to which a person’s dignity has been 
violated. First, the court looked at the position of the complainant in society. The fact that 
post facto same-sex couples are forced or compelled to apply for a divorce decree on account 
of one spouse affirming their gender identity is indicative that the couple is being 
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marginalised. These couples embody the historical oppression that LGBTI people have 
experienced, and are still experiencing as is evident from the South African Human Rights 
Commissions Report of 2012.
36
 They factually prove that post facto same-sex couples occupy 
a particularly adverse social position.  
Secondly, it determined what the nature of the discriminatory law or action, in this case 
action, is. The nature of the discriminatory action (practice) amount to exclusion because the 
Department of Home Affairs exclusively pursues this line of action that arbitrarily excludes 
couples from the protection of the Marriage Act if they affirm a non-normative sexual and 
gender identity.  
Thirdly, the court provided that the purpose of the discrimination had to be ascertained to 
provide context. It would appear, in the absence of valid justifications, that the purpose of the 
discrimination is to protect the holy, pure and sacret institution of marriage for ‘normal’ 
heterosexual, cisgender and monogamous people from those ‘social dissidents’ that by 
default of their existence do not embody these ideals.  
Lastly, the court stated that the extent to which the right of the complainant was impaired was 
another factor to be considered. The administrative action by the Department of Home 
Affairs of forcing or compelling married couples, who have the intention to remain married, 
to commit perjury (by stating in a court of law that their marriage has broken down 
irretrievably and then having to carry the legal and social consequences of such an assertion) 
stands in direct contrast to section 3(3) of the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status 
Act. Section 3(3) presupposes that a post facto same-sex couple may remain married as 
gender affirmation does not adversely affect the rights which accrued to a transsexual person 
before such affirmation, afterwards. The fact that the couple is denied protection under 
section 3(3) is evident of the extent to which the couple’s right to dignity, equality, freedom 
and to remain married has been impaired. 
4.3.2.3.      Right to freedom 
Section 12(2)(b) expressly provides that a person has the right to the freedom and security of 
their person which consists of the right to bodily and psychological integrity and includes the 
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right to security in and control over their body.
37
 This right links up with the right to dignity 
and the right to privacy.
38
 Divorce proceedings can be quite challenging on the parties 
involved and the family unit as a whole. It literally dismantles the protections offered by 
marriage. It involves various interests which include their financial position, children
39
 and 
the associated psychological trauma that may accompany on account of the myriad of 
uncertainties. By unduly subjecting post facto same-sex couples to these experiences is a 
direct attack on the psychological integrity and dignity of the family unit and the parties 
involved. 
In analysing the rights which post facto same-sex couples are entitled to in the preservation of 
their family unit, it would seem as if the Department of Home Affairs is making adverse 
determinations that place these couples in a precarious position of choosing between the right 
to self-determination and affirmation and the right to found a family. The fact that these 
couples are put at risk legally due to the dismantling of the family unit at the instance of the 
State sends a strong message in a constitutional democracy that certain bodies and 
relationships matter more than others. This is ironic as South Africa’s Constitution and 
subordinate laws expressly aim to protect the most marginalised people and communities 
from socially dominant groups and ideologies. 
4.4.      South African legislation 
For the purpose of this thesis four vital pieces of legislation will be discussed in light of a 
post facto same-sex couple’s right to remain married under the Marriage Act. These include 
the Marriage Act,
40
 Divorce Act
41
 (and briefly focusing on the ways in which a marriage may 
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      Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). 
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  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), s14. S14 encompasses a person’s right to privacy. 
 
39  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), s28. According to section 28, the best interest of the 
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be dissolved), Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act
42
 and Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act.
43
 
4.4.1. Marriage Act 
In 2001, the South African Law Commission launched a report reviewing the Marriage Act.
44
 
The objective of the report was directed at establishing the adequacy of provisions of the 
Marriage Act and considered whether certain provisions had to be amended and if so how 
such amendments would be affected in order to align the Marriage Act with the South 
African Constitution.
45
 In addressing the wide proliferation and fragmentation of marriage 
rights in South Africa, the Commission recommended that the Marriage Act be consolidated 
in order to address and make provision for civil, religious and customary marriages in future 
under one Marriage Act.
46
 However, contrary to this not much focus has been placed by the 
legislature and the judiciary in progressively working towards a unified piece of legislation 
that recognises different forms of intimate relationships whether it be marriage, unions, life 
partnerships or domestic partnerships. In contrast, the legislature has in effect fragmented 
marriage law in South Africa further and subjected itself to employ the apartheid doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ by promulgating the Civil Union Act.  
                                                          
42
  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
 
43
  Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003. 
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  South African Law Commission (Project 109) Report on the review of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (May 
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  South African Law Commission (Project 109) Report on the review of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (May 
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  South African Law Commission (Project 109) Report on the review of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (May 
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The definition of a marriage legally concluded for the purpose of the Marriage Act 
traditionally was that of ‘a voluntary union between a man and a woman to the exclusion of 
all others before it was invalidated, in as far as it unfairly discriminated against same-sex 
couples who wished to get married, by the Constitutional Court in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fourie.
47
 Currently, in practice, same-sex couples are not allowed to marry in terms of the 
Marriage Act because of the Civil Union Act having acquired that purpose particularly for 
same-sex couples. Post facto same-sex couples problematise the simplistic understanding of 
the purpose of these two Acts. 
In order to determine whether post facto same-sex couples have a right to remain married, 
this section focuses on an overview of the requirements for the conclusion of a valid civil 
marriage in terms of the Marriage Act. The first requirement is that both parties must have 
the legal capacity to marry one another at the time the marriage is concluded.
48
 This would 
mean that the parties must be of the opposite sex legally and of marriageable age when 
concluding the marriage.
49
 In the case of post facto same-sex couples this is legally the case. 
For all intents and purposes the couple, at the time when the marriage was concluded, was 
both de facto and de jure an opposite-sex couple of marriageable age. 
Secondly, the requirement of consensus must be met. This requirement is met when the 
parties expressly affirm their intention to accept one another as a spouse.
50
 The requirement 
of consensus can only be negated if the minds of the parties never met based on a material 
mistake as to the person’s identity (error in personam) or the nature of the juristic act (error 
in negotio). The context of this thesis is premised on the fact that the one spouse becomes 
aware of the post facto transgender gender identity of the other spouse and asserts that he or 
she still wants to remain married to the person. Hence, the cisgender spouse expressly 
consents to accepting the transgender partner as a spouse. Any claim which the cisgender 
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  Skelton, A. et al. Family law in South Africa (2010) 34 - 44. 
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  Skelton, A. et al. Family Law in South Africa (2010) 36. In practice a person’s ‘sex’ may give rise to couples 
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spouse could have depended on to have the marriage set aside based on material mistake 
loses application. 
Another ground to invalidate consensus at the instance of the ‘innocent’ party is 
misrepresentation.
51
 However, the ground of misrepresentation is very contentious in light of 
social sciences arguments that sexuality, gender identification and sexual orientation are 
complex by their very nature, especially when one seeks an understanding in hard and fast 
rules. It would be a fallacy to claim that the spouse misrepresented him or herself as a person 
of the opposite sex when the spouse later affirm the same-sexed body as the spouse whom he 
or she married. Misrepresentation renders a marriage voidable at the instance of the misled 
party which means that if the misled party does not want to have the marriage set aside that 
he or she should not automatically loose the right to remain married in terms of the Marriage 
Act because society and the law are inconvenienced at the instance of having a post facto 
same-sex marriage governed by the Marriage Act. The exercise of rigid discretion on the part 
of officials within the Department of Home Affairs and the framing of the law bring into 
question the objectivity of the law, its agents and what they seek to achieve.  
Thirdly, lawfulness requires that the marriage complies with all the legal requirements either 
before or at the time when the marriage is concluded.
52
 It does not mention anything to the 
affect that certain requirements must continue to be met after the conclusion of the marriage. 
In fact, the lawfulness legal requirement of a marriage being between a man and a woman 
was invalidated in the case of Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie.
53
 Lastly, all prescribed 
formalities must have been met when the marriage was concluded in order for a valid 
marriage to have come into legal existence. 
The overall issue relating to the status of a post facto same-sex marriage is premised on 
events that occurred subsequent to the conclusion of the marriage. Therefore, the question to 
be addressed is whether the events that occurred after the legal conclusion of the marriage 
have any adverse effect on the lawfulness of the marriage.  
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The Gender Research Project correctly argued in its submission to the South African Law 
Commission’s Report on the review of the Marriage Act, that if the aim and foundation of 
family law is to protect ‘vulnerable’ family members from disadvantage, then the current 
emphasis in the law which links many protections to the institution of marriage needs serious 
reconsideration and interrogation.
54
 Hence, the recommendation made is that legal protection 
of families should thus be based on the functionality of the family and not based on how the 
family fits into a model of the nuclear, monogamous, heteronormative family form.
55
 Hence, 
the effect of the dissenting judgement by O’Reagan in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 
would have been the appropriate course of action and would have resulted in a greater 
safeguard legislatively for all by utilising gender neutral language in the Marriage Act as a 
starting point.
56
 
4.4.2. Divorce Act and ways of dissolving a marriage 
A marriage that has been legally concluded can only be dissolved in one of three ways. It can 
be dissolved by way of death of at least one spouse, or by having the marriage annulled due 
to it being voidable or by way of divorce.
57
 
To the exclusion of dissolution by death, a marriage can only be dissolved at the instance of 
at least one party voluntarily, unless declared void by a court of law based on some or other 
illegality. The mere fact that a post facto same-sex marriage appear to be irregular does not 
mean that it is or ought to be classified as invalid or illegal. Since one of the parties in the 
context of this paper has not been declared dead, the marriage cannot dissolve by way of 
death. Due to the fact that both spouses choose to remain married, even in light of the one 
being able to potentially rely on the ground of misrepresentation in order to negate the 
requirement of consensus, there is no legal ground upon which the marriage can be annulled 
legally without the consent of the presumed misled spouse. To this, since neither spouses 
want to get divorced, no legal grounds would appear to exist that justifies the dissolution of 
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the marriage. In fact, the effect of being coerced to divorce negates the consent given to such 
divorce proceedings.  
4.4.3. Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 
Hofman argues that ‘only those bodies that fit the [binary] schema “matters”…’58 This thesis 
critically questions, whilst at the same time being conscious of the gender dysphoria 
transsexual people are diagnosed with, the notion that the Alteration of Sex Description and 
Sex Status Act (Act 49) positions transsexual persons legally to fit the binary mould, by 
virtue of affirming them as the opposite sex. The Act, although progressive by allowing 
transsexual people to exercise their right to self-determination and agency, should be 
questioned for its narrow binary construction that excludes gender non-conforming and 
intersex bodies from the ambit of ‘mattering’ meaningfully in law.  
The Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act was passed by parliament to legally 
recognise the affirmed sex of a person due to gender affirmation surgery. The effect of the 
Act is that a person would for all legal purposes, at least, be recognised as a person of the 
affirmed sex. 
Section 3(3) of the Act provides that the ‘rights and obligations that have accrued to such 
person before the alteration of his or her sex description are not adversely affected by the 
alteration.’59 This is a watered-down version from the 1992 Amendment Act that stipulated 
that ‘no existing rights and obligations that have been acquired by or accrued to the applicant 
before the alteration of the sex description shall be abolished by the alteration.’60 Currently, 
the purpose of this section is quite unclear and its application quite vague. Many questions 
can be asked. Was this a mere token inclusion? Was it included to protect third parties and 
‘innocent’ or ‘misled’ spouses from the ‘so-called’ legal deception that may be brought about 
by transsexual people? Was it included to protect the interests of transsexual people in order 
for them not to be treated differently by virtue of losing their legal subjectivity completely? 
Currently, it appears as if the purpose of the section is more focussed on protecting external 
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parties from being prejudiced by the gender affirmation process than it is about protecting 
transsexual people from social and structural prejudice embodied in policies and laws.  The 
price paid by post facto same-sex couples when they are subjected to forced or compulsory 
divorces is that when individuals and couples claim their autonomy and agency outside the 
norms of society, they are subjected to social punishment and relegated to the margins.  
When the State positions post facto same-sex marriages as invalid under the Marriage Act 
and justifies the invalidation with the Civil Union Act that is available for same-sex couples, 
it is illustrative of the blatant disregard that the State has for its legal obligation to protect and 
preserve the family unit and the right to remain married which accrues to the couple.  
4.4.4.    Claiming the right to just administration action 
The Promotion of Administration Justice Act burdens the State with the onus of having to 
give effect to administration action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair in light of 
having to provide written reasons for administration action taken.
61
 Section 33 of the South 
African Constitution asserts this right and provides that everyone whose rights have been 
adversely affected by administration action has the right to be furnished with written 
reasons.
62
 Currently, no evidence suggest that post facto same-sex couples are furnished with 
written reasons as to why they need to divorce. 
Aligned with section 33(1) and (2) of the Constitution and the preamble of the Promotion of 
Administration Justice Act is section 3(3) of the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status 
Act which provides that a person’s rights shall not be adversely affected by an affirmation of 
gender. However, subjecting couples to compulsory or forced divorces does amount to 
questionable administration action that adversely affects them. The termination of marriage is 
no simple inconvenience associated with an affirmation of gender. It gives rise to many legal 
implications and places couples in adverse positions which were in no way their choice. The 
institute of marriage brings about a kaleidoscope of protections, tangible and intangible as 
well as social and economic. On account of administration action taken by the Department of 
Home Affairs, post facto same-sex couples are subjected to an experience of being positioned 
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as second-class citizens on account of their ‘deviant’ sexual orientation and gender identity.63 
Such action is particularly questionable when contextualised within South Africa’s past and 
unjust, unreasonable and unfair administrative action that were legitimised giving rise to the 
policing of bodies. It cruelly legalised and validated who could marry whom under apartheid 
with the inception of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act with the aim of ‘protecting’ the 
‘pure’, ‘sacred’ white race from the ‘abhorrent’ non-white races.64 
Currently, there is great uncertainty as to the lawfulness of subjecting post facto same-sex 
couples to compulsory or forced divorces, in the absence of an express empowering provision 
supporting such action. This practice of compelling post facto same-sex couples to appear 
before a court of law and lie, stating that their marriage has broken down irretrievably, 
suggests that officials at the Department of Home Affairs are not acting within the ambit of 
an empowering position. This causes for great suspicion since it can be argued that the couple 
has a prima facie right to remain married under the Marriage Act and that they are currently 
denied the benefit of exercising this right. In light of this, a departure from such right needs to 
be evaluated to establish whether the deprivation of such right is justified. Currently, nothing 
suggest that such action is justified, reasonable and fair. Hence, the question thus becomes 
‘what are the reasons for the administrative action?’ 
In establishing the lawfulness, reasonableness and fairness of the said administrative action, 
perhaps the matter should be put to judicial review in terms of section 6 of Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act to determine the nature and scope of the right to remain married in 
light of the exercise of presumably unjust, unfair and unreasonable administration action.  
4.5.      Conclusion 
Much like institutional racism was the driving force behind dividing a country based on race 
so too is institutionalised homophobia, transphobia, biphobia and sexism, even in a 
democratic dispensation, also the driving force behind perpetuating discrimination against 
marginalised populations. Laws and statutes affect marginalised populations by mostly only 
making provision for the general rule, a heteronormative and cisgender society and not 
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catering for the needs of people who do not find expression in this. Institutional 
discrimination is encompassed in laws and statutes.
65
 This is evident by virtue of both the 
Marriage Act and Civil Union Act seeking to achieve the same goal legally. Having two 
separate pieces of legislation seeking to achieve the same legal objective is an indication that 
there is segregation within our marriage law. Hence, there is a need for the democratic 
programme to become more vested and dedicated to empowering and liberating populations 
at risk of marginalisation by enacting and applying laws that promotes constitutional 
imperatives and eradicate the legal risks they are exposed to. 
None of the requirements for the conclusion and existence of a valid civil marriage in terms 
of the Marriage Act suggest that the marriage of a post facto same-sex couples is invalid or 
unlawful. The Divorce Act is silent in that it does not provide guidance on the dissolution of 
marriage outside its scope of dissolution by death, voluntary divorce and annulment by a 
court based on it being void. Post facto same-sex marriages cannot be considered void as they 
met all the requirements of a valid marriage at the moment it was concluded. Although, 
perhaps, voidable, the cisgender spouse waives their claim to have the marriage set aside as 
voidable by assenting to the union as is. These determinations, coupled with the effect of 
section 3(3) of the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act as well as the Promotion 
of Administration Justice Act, provides a solid foundation upon which post facto same-sex 
couples can claim their right to remain married in terms of the Marriage Act. 
In ascertaining how the law of marriage can mitigate the legal and social risks post facto 
same-sex couples are exposed to, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis by advancing certain 
recommendations on how the law can enhance its responses to the needs of people and 
couples embodying non-normative sexualities and gender identities. 
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  Jacobson, C.K., Amoateng, A.Y. & Heaton, T.B. ‘Inter-racial marriages in South Africa’ (2004) 35(3) Journal 
of Comparative Family Studies 444 – 45. ’Since the transition to the new government, South Africa has 
been exposed to more tolerant treatment of race. This has occurred through mechanisms such as the 
media, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and supportive leadership.’ 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1.      Introduction 
One of the greatest challenges experienced whilst compiling this thesis, is that of escaping 
what seems to be an inevitable heteronormative trap, particularly as it relates to the traditional 
binary construction of sex and gender, in arguing that post facto same-sex couples have a 
right to remain married under the Marriage Act. Arguing for the recognition and protection 
for post facto same-sex couples is strained by the law of marriage that has been constructed 
using normative heterosexual values that rigidly codes marriage under the Marriage Act.  
Within the limited legal scope, radical legal transformation in the law of marriage is strained 
in claiming practical relief for post facto same-sex couples. The reliance on the legal certainty 
that the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act brings about in reclassifying a 
transsexual person and his or her sex as a fixity in the scope of the traditional binary sexes 
and potentially reinforcing this oppressive ideology, in turn, is a necessary compromise for 
practical relief in the short term. This argument, in turn, does tend to undermine a broader 
transformational politic for transgender people in the long term when viewed from the 
margins. However, an argument can also be made that by virtue of asserting the right to 
remain married, that post facto same-sex couples are challenging the heteronormative status 
quo and that it has the potential of unlocking a different debate around the trajectory of South 
Africa’s fragmented marriage law system and the implications it has for promoting 
inclusivity, equality, dignity and transformation for all people. 
5.2. Politics of difference: Paving a way forward despite the status quo 
McFadden argues that “thorough state sponsored and endorsed practices of heterosexual 
marriage; cultural and traditional conventions; gendered identities deny people personhood 
and all aspects of human integrity.”1 To this, Hofman correctly argues that the law is 
parochial and often struggles to catch up and respond to new truths about sex, gender, 
sexuality and identity revealed by science.
2
 Hence, it runs the risk of constructing that which 
                                                          
1
  McFadden, P. ‘Challenging empowerment’ (2010) 53 (2) Society for International Development 163. 
 
2
  Hofman, D.L.C. ‘Male, Female and Other: How science, medicine and law treat the intersexed, and the 
implications for a sex-dependent law’ (2012) 21 Tulane Journal of Law and Sexuality 2; Greenberg, J.A. 
‘Defining male and female: Intersectionality and the collision between law and biology’ (1999) 41 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 265, 267 – 68. 
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it perceives as exceptional, such as post facto same-sex marriages, as ‘abnormal’ or ‘deviant’. 
Consequently, this provides a warped justification for compulsory or forced divorces. 
In advocating for transformation and legal recognition with the intention of providing legal 
protection to parties with non-normative sexualities and gender identities in intimate 
relationships, legal reformation has conflated the complexities of human intimate 
relationships to a hegemonic binary of opposite-sex and same-sex intimate relationships.
3
 The 
consequences are therefore dire for post facto same-sex couples who problematise this false 
dichotomy using Queer Theory, Feminist critique and Transgender Theory as instruments of 
analysis.
4
 Such false dichotomy becomes evident in ‘bureaucratic blunders’ such as 
compulsory or forced divorces that transsexual people are unnecessarily and unduly exposed 
to.
5
 
The institution of marriage, falling under the branch of family law, occupies significant 
importance in South African society. According to Sachs J, its importance is located in the 
central role it plays and the consequences it gives rise to in South Africa.
6
 In centrally 
locating the institution of marriage within South African society, Sachs J, although critical of 
its exclusionary nature and advocating for the vindication of marriage rights for same-sex 
couples, still finds himself challenged by the dexterity of heteronormativity.
7
 He is confined 
to arguing for same-sex marriage only in as far as it relates to it mimicking heterosexual 
                                                          
3
  Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Minutes: Home Affairs portfolio committee on Alteration of Sex 
Description and Sex Status Bill: Hearings’ (9 September 2003) available at http://pmg.org.za/committee-
meeting/2832/. Discussions leading up the passing of the Civil Union Act by Parliament in 2007 is 
indicative of a process that was dominated by gay and lesbian politics to the detriment of transgender 
and intersex people. Consequently, the crafting of legal protection for same-sex couples has been coded 
with heteronormative and cisgender values. 
 
4
  See Chapter 2 for theoretical framework. 
 
5
  Legal Resources Centre & Gender Dynamix Briefing paper: Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 
No. 49 of 2003 (2014) 24. The briefing paper identifies forced divorces for post facto same-sex couples as 
being directly tied to the ineffectual implementation of Act 49 in light of the strained interpretation and 
provisioning of the Marriage Act as well as the lack of recognition extended to the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 
in guiding the dissolution of marriage process.   
 
6
  See generally Sachs, A. The soft vengeance of a freedom fighter (2011); Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 
2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) para72; Barnard-Naudè, J. & De Vos, P. ‘Disturbing heteronormativity: The “queer” 
jurisprudence of Albie Sachs’ (2010) SAPL 221. 
 
7
  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) para72. Sachs J held that to deny same-sex 
couples the choice of getting married was to negate their right to self-determination in a very profound 
way; Barnard-Naudè, J. & De Vos, P. ‘Disturbing heteronormativity: The “queer” jurisprudence of Albie 
Sachs’ (2010) SAPL 212; See generally Robson, R. ‘Sexual democracy’ (2007) 23 SAJHR. 
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marriage. However, such limitation is to be expected since Johnson correctly argues that 
citizenship in itself is heteronormatively conceptualised and ultimately forms the foundation 
for the political system and associated discourses such as the law that resultantly undermine 
marginalised and oppressed people who fail to conform to this ideal.
8
 This argument is 
supported by Barnard-Naudè and De Vos who argue that the dexterity of heteronormativity 
operates in such a way that it lends itself to being disturbed, but still coerces those disturbing 
it to yield to its disciplinary power and knowledge.
9
 However, this does not presume that the 
law of marriage, in as far as it relates to the disturbance of the insidious status quo protected 
by the Marriage Act, cannot be transformed to extend legal protection to post facto same-sex 
couples. In effect, by transforming the construction of the institute of marriage from within 
the confines of the Marriage Act can possibly initiate a process of dismantling the hegemonic 
nature of the heteronormatively ideal marriage, to be untouched and unfettered with by 
‘social dissidents’. 
From inequality to a place of substantive equality, from being positioned as ‘abnormal’ and 
‘deviant’ to asserting difference without being subjected to second-class citizenship, to 
dismantling sex and gender binaries, the law of marriage still has a long way to go in 
realising the ideal of a democratic South Africa that has broken all ties with its oppressive 
past. Modiri correctly argues that despite a progressive Constitution, arguably the finest in the 
world that is committed to democracy, transformation, substantive equality, social 
reconciliation and plurality, that purposive interpretation continues to be trapped within the 
legal doctrines of formalism and legalism.
10
 Currently, the collective imagination of South 
Africa is inherently gendered and hierarchical as it is premised on a collective of families that 
ascribe to compulsory heterosexuality and patriarchy.
11
 Hence, what it still represents, is that 
relationships and individual bodies be structured around these ideologies. Due to the 
operation of these dominant norms post facto same-sex marriages are positioned as disruptive 
                                                          
8
  Johnson, C. ‘Heteronormative citizenship and the politics of passing’ (2002) Sexualities 317. 
 
9
  Barnard-Naudè, J. & De Vos, P. ‘Disturbing heteronormativity: The “queer” jurisprudence of Albie Sachs’ 
(2010) SAPL 234. 
 
10
  Modiri, J.M. ‘Transformation, tension and transgression: Reflections on the culture and ideology of South 
African legal education’ (2013) 3 STELL LR 406; Klare, K. ‘Legal culture and transformative 
constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 165; Van Marle, K. ‘Revisiting the politics of post-apartheid 
constitutional interpretation’ (2003) TSAR 549; Davis, D.M. ‘Transformation: The constitutional promise 
and reality’ (2010) 26 SAJHR 85.  
 
11
  Schuhmann, A. ‘Taming transgressions: South African nation building and “body politics”’ (2010) 24(83) 
Agenda 97. 
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relationships to be positioned as something there, perhaps under the Civil Union Act, in order 
to protect and preserve the so-called sacred traditional marriage under the Marriage Act for  
heterosexual unions.  
Queer Theory, Transgender Theory and Feminist critique expose critically and truthfully that 
the law itself has never been neutral or apolitical and has been instrumental in regulating the 
divide between the good ‘normal’ citizen and bad ‘deviant’ bodies.12 The construction of 
human existence and the validation of certain human bodies and relationships has been 
intensely influenced by the dominant ideology of the 21
st
 century, that of neo-liberalism in a 
late capitalist society such as South Africa. Braidotti correctly argues that late capitalism 
appears to be a system that promotes radical politics in order to advance the interests of the 
marginalised without including and allowing for their material participation throughout the 
process.
13
 Thus, the Department of Home Affairs (the State) can make adverse decisions 
about non-normative bodies ‘in their best interests’ without positively impacting their lived 
realities as the case currently presents for post facto same-sex couples. The appearance of 
advancement in actual fact results in disenfranchising the couple at the instance of a 
bureaucratic disciplinary social order. Instead of minimising injustice, inequality and 
exclusion it acts as a vehicle to proliferate these by constructing the law as neutral, objective 
and apolitical.
14
 Thus, ironically, the law is intricately tied up with this ideology by seeking to 
advance the interests of the couple within a model of justice defined within the ambit of a 
conservative legal culture inhibited by other dominant ideologies such as patriarchy and 
heteronormativity that seek to marginalise particular bodies for its continued dominant 
existence.  
The ideology of patriarchy is deeply imbedded in both Western and African cultures.
15
 South 
Africa is no exception. Patriarchy is irrevocably enmeshed with Afrocentric cultures in South 
                                                          
12
  Modiri, J.M. ‘Transformation, tension and transgression: Reflections on the culture and ideology of South 
African legal education’ (2013) 3 STELL LR 456. 
 
13
  Martinsson, L. & Reimers, E. eds Norm-struggles: Sexualities and contentions (2010) 69.  
 
14
  Modiri, J.M. ‘Transformation, tension and transgression: Reflections on the culture and ideology of South 
African legal education’ (2013) 3 STELL LR 455 to 7; Brown, W. ‘Wounded attachments’ (1993) 21 Political 
Theory 390. 
 
15
  Coetzee, D. ‘South African education and the ideology of patriarchy’ 2001 South African Journal of 
Education 21(4) 300; See generally Van der Walt, B.J. The Liberating Message — A Christian Worldview for 
Africa (1994). 
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Africa.
16
 In return patriarchy calls upon another powerful ideology, ‘compulsory 
heterosexuality’, to condition society using State functionaries as agents. Supporting 
‘compulsory heterosexuality’ is the idea that a person’s gender is predetermined by their sex 
assigned at birth, which results in cisgenderism being the only legitimate gender identity that 
people ought to subscribe to. Consequently, the result of ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ is a 
culture or society that constructs its citizens in relation to men, heterosexuality and 
cisgenderism as an ideal that all human beings should aspire to.
17
  
In order to understand how the law interacts or can interact with marginalised bodies, people 
and communities, it is important to understand the historical context and current realities 
within which post facto same-sex couples find themselves, in relation to the possible future(s) 
that the law is able to carve out for them.
18
 This is a necessary measure as it maximises the 
possibility of a livable life with the least amount of structural and policy challenges as 
opposed to the possibility of living an unbearable life which in turn results to a social or 
literal death of personhood.
19
  
5.3.      Recommendations 
This section advances certain recommendations in support of post facto same-sex couples 
retaining their right to remain married under the Marriage Act, irrespective of their sexual 
orientation and/or gender identity. These recommendations include how language construct 
bodies, an interrogation of the legal gaze(s), how transformation is viewed or ought to be 
viewed and questioning the State’s use of power.  
5.3.1. Language as a tool of oppression 
The linguistic processes through which diverse and different human bodies and relationships 
are conceptualised and how they acquire meaning is a site of great struggle. This has been 
                                                          
16
  Coetzee, D. ‘South African education and the ideology of patriarchy’ (2001) South African Journal of 
Education 21(4) 300; See generally Van der Walt, B.J. The Liberating Message — A Christian Worldview for 
Africa (1994). 
 
17
  Race, geographical location and bodily ability are also other determining factors in constructing dominant 
identities. In this way the dominant identity relating to human existence is that of a white, cisgender, 
heterosexual, able-bodied male preferably of Western origin.  
 
18
  Butler, J. Undoing Gender (2004) 8; Husakouskaya, N. ‘Rethinking gender and human rights through 
transgender and intersex experiences in South Africa’ (2013) 27(4) Agenda 10. 
 
19
  Butler, J. Undoing Gender (2004) 8; Husakouskaya, N. ‘Rethinking gender and human rights through 
transgender and intersex experiences in South Africa’ (2013) 27(4) Agenda 10. 
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illustrated by the myriad of queer judgments, particularly as reasoned by Sachs J, that has 
been framed, although at times radically, mostly within the confines of the heteronormative, 
monogamous and neo-liberal and capitalist status quo. When viewing rights accruing and 
realisable to same-sex couples, the struggle has benefited those who has been able to prove 
their ‘sameness’ to the dominant status quo and those predominantly in a comfortable socio-
economic position, which is not a reality for most people with a non-normative sexuality 
and/or gender identity. Hence, an argument can be made that the rights won through the 
struggle has been framed linguistically neutral in a way that provides freedom and equality to 
those who are not too different and socio-economically powerful. In other words the law thus 
protects the ‘good and not too far removed “gay” citizen.’  
There is thus a need for the law to be critically (re)evaluated, particularly as it relates to how 
language construct rights and constitute bodies as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. When language has been 
used in service of the dominant status quo, the question becomes how do drafters of laws 
overcome the inevitable traps of patriarchy, heteronormativity and socio-economic privilege, 
that the status quo presents, in the pursuit of incorporating difference into the letter of the law 
in a transformatory way that positively impacts the lives of non-normative people equitably 
and meaningfully in line with that of the norm. 
5.3.2. Interrogating the legal gaze(s) in the law of marriage 
If the aim of the law is to reconcile ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’, the question becomes how 
does the law do this without compromising a transformatory politic to equitably incorporate 
difference. When engaging with the letter of the law, it is important to understand that 
whoever interprets language (the law), attach meaning to words and produce a particular legal 
gaze as a tool to understand human bodies, human existence and human relationships. As 
mentioned above, the law has never been neutral, objective or apolitical. The law, both 
international and domestic law (statutes and case law), interpolates post facto same-sex 
marriages and subjectivities in very particular ways. Involving aspects of actual or perceived 
homosexual sexual orientation and transgender gender identity simultaneously, the scope for 
various fixed ways of gazing upon such relationships with the aim of boxing is great. It is for 
this reason that the Department of Home Affairs is currently ‘regulating’ (or rather policing), 
legitimising and reinforcing the dominant status quo by overtly making visible the divide 
between what it deems as ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’.  
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5.3.3. Differentiating between social inclusion, substantive equality and social 
 transformation 
Social inclusion does not necessarily amount to social transformation. It does not necessarily 
apply the transformation imperatives that substantive equality proposes. 
In contrast to mere formal recognition in law, presupposing social inclusion, substantive 
equality has four primary characteristics which includes having to understand inequality 
contextually within a particular society linked to its history, the impact which the inequality 
has on a complainant, recognising that difference is a positive feature within a society; and 
understanding the purpose of a right coupled with its concerns premised on remedying 
systematic subordination or disadvantage.
20
  In addition to these four primary characteristics, 
another characteristic that can be linked to transformative substantive equality is the ability to 
affirm or at least imagine a future society that has been transformed through substantive 
equality.
21
 Such transformation must, however, be practically possible through desired 
remedies and informed by normative values.
22
 By virtue of these characteristics, a necessary 
retreat away from legal formalism would occur as the law will be understood as a product of 
social relations informed by a transformative agenda.
23
  
Post facto same-sex couples have both historically and contemporarily occupied a space of 
inequality. South Africa’s history illustrates the struggle people with non-normative 
sexualities and gender identities faces, respectively. It is, however, silent on the unique and 
compounded oppression faced by post facto same-sex couples as they are affected by both 
struggles simultaneously. The impact of such compounded discrimination is aggravated by 
virtue of a system that applies particular ideologies seeking to marginalise them by all means, 
as is noticeable on account of the administration action taken by the Department of Home 
Affairs. This particular administration action also indicates that the State does not seek to 
remedy the systematic subordination or disadvantaged suffered by post facto same-sex 
couples. In actuality, it perpetuates and aggravates the legal position. Hence, it rejects the 
                                                          
20
  Albertyn, C. ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa’ 2007 (23) SAJHR 258; See generally 
Rhode, D. ‘The politics of paradigms’ In Bock, G. & James, S. Beyond inequality and difference (1992) 149. 
 
21
  Albertyn, C. ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa’ 2007 (23) SAJHR 258. 
 
22
  Albertyn, C. ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa’ 2007 (23) SAJHR 258. 
 
23
  Albertyn, C. ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa’ 2007 (23) SAJHR 258. 
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application of substantive equality and affirmation of difference as a positive social feature 
by positioning post facto same-sex couples away from the centre. 
5.3.4. Non-normative sexualities and gender identities and relationships with the State 
The State is constitutionally obliged to align its processes with constitutional imperatives as 
opposed to adopting a Christian morality, particularly where the application of such morality 
compromises the rights of ‘Others’. In a modern democratic State, there should be a clear 
demarcation and separation between State and religion.  
On account of the provisions made in the Promotion of Administration Justice Act, it appears 
as if the Department of Home Affairs is making adverse determinations about the relationship 
status of post facto same-sex couples without being empowered to do so, in a manner that is 
unconstitutional. The decision-making processes are indicative of the dominant ideologies as 
mentioned above, being in full operation. For this reason, the Department of Home Affairs 
needs to interrogate its relationship with conservative identity politics and discourses that 
limitedly validates non-normativity in as far as it aspires to embody the heteronormative 
status quo. Perhaps not the intention, but the effect of subjecting post facto same-sex 
marriages to compulsory or forced divorces is that of overt discrimination, unequal treatment 
and attack on the couple’s dignity. 
5.3.5. Functional model 
In Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd
24
 The court handed down a very 
homo(normative) judgment. It held, in response to the legitimacy of a same-sex relationship, 
that: 
The test has to be whether the relationship of the appellant to the deceased was one where there is 
at least a broadly recognisable de facto familial nexus. I would not define that familial nexus in 
terms of its structures and components: I would rather focus on familial functions. The question is 
more on what a family does than what a family is. The family unit is a social organisation which 
functions through its linking its members closely together. The functions may be procreative, 
sexual, social, economic, emotional. The list is not exhaustive. Not all families function the same 
way. 
Post facto same-sex couples destabilise the existing taxonomic classification systems of  
                                                          
24
  Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [1997] 4 All ER 991 (CA) ([1998] 2 WLR 225). 
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identity by airing socio-legal dilemmas that is long overdue.
25
 De Vos argues that the legal 
regulation of intimate relationships move away from the marriage model to a functional 
model that addresses the unequal power relations in intimate relationships as presented by 
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association.
26
 Both South African law and international law 
emphasise that families differ and comes in various forms. Both systems stress the 
importance of protecting family formations and advocates against States disintegrating family 
units. These systems put the responsibility on the South African State to actively protect and 
preserve families, including post facto same-sex marriages. 
With South Africa’s commitment to equality, dignity and freedom of all people in all sectors 
of the nation, there is a clear commitment to protect existing family units, including post 
facto same-sex families. Nothing in the law appears to want to retract from existing 
protections which are provided for by valid secular institutions that protect families, such as 
marriage. Hence, by promoting the inclusion of post facto same-sex couples under the 
Marriage Act, South Africa can start re-imagining a more comprehensive ‘marriage’ law that 
recognises all forms of intimate relationships in a way that dignifiedly unites the various 
fragmented pieces of legislation governing intimate relationships. 
5.4.     Conclusion 
Post facto same-sex couples have a right to remain married under the Marriage Act as they 
would have remained married unquestionably had it not been for the gender affirmation of 
one spouse. The State forcing a couple to apply for a divorce decree in cases where a 
marriage exists de facto and de jure is unconstitutional. Such action blatantly disregards the 
couple’s constitutional rights to dignity, substantive equality and freedom to determine their 
own destiny. Instead of facilitating a smooth transition within the law for both the transsexual 
and cisgender spouse and their marriage, the Department of Home Affairs has opted to 
subject them and their relationship to undue strain which stands stark contradiction to the 
States obligation to protect and preserve family units. 
The remedial mechanism of forced divorces and subsequent remarriage in terms of the Civil 
Union Act disregard the constitutional rights of spouses to post facto same-sex marriages. In 
order to promote substantive equality and transformation lawmakers and interpreters need to 
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     Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd (1997) 4 All ER 991 (CA) ([1998] 2 WLR 225). 
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     Pfeffer, C.A. ‘Normative resistance and inventive pragmatism: Negotiating structure and agency in    
        transgender families’ (August 2012) Gender & Society 574. 
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take into account existing legislation such as the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status 
Act in addition to the existing equality jurisprudence on same-sex marriages in order to 
produce an outcome that preserve the integrity of post facto same-sex couples. 
Whilst the law concerns itself with longer term imperatives on the trajectory of marriage law 
in South Africa, it is important to consider immediate and short-term remedies that are 
constitutionally sound in which to protect the dignity and freedom of these couples. This 
becomes possible when the State refrains from imposing itself as agent and defenders of 
heteronormativity, cisgender privilege and patriarchy. 
Inequality is changeable because it is socially constructed. Transformation is possible when a 
system invest time and effort into understanding and respecting difference. The State is able 
to understand how to respect and protect post facto same-sex couples when it abandons 
heteronormativity, cisgender and patriarchy as its lens of analysis. The mere fact that the 
marriage status of post facto same-sex couples are brought into question and relegated to the 
margins, under the Civil Union Act, is indicative of the hegemony patriarchy, 
heteronormativity and cisgenderism has over the law and within society at large. The State, 
law makers and interpreters need to take more vigorous ownership of their roles in affecting 
transformation for all in a dignified manner without subjecting marginalised groups to further 
marginalisation through their actions.  
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